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WINTER 2018 / ISSUE 01

STUDENT PAPER SERIES



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Cover: *Wanderer above the sea of fog* (1817) by Caspar David Friedrich.

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HOW HAS MIGRATION BEEN SECURITIZED IN THE EU HOTSPOTS?

Chiara Troiano

This essay will first analyze the concept of "securitization" introduced by the Copenhagen School, followed by some of the critiques which arose against this theory, among which the need to reconceptualise humanitarianism as a sector of security. Then it will be demonstrated how humanitarianism is not to be thought as a distinct, separate section of security, which contradicts the security approach, but as a continuum of it. The humanitarian-security nexus will then be applied in a case study concerning the Italian hotspots.

In the last decades, powerful terms such as "risk" and "security" have become more and more common in the discussion in and outside Academia. However, there has been a significant transformation in their meaning, especially after the Cold War, when the Copenhagen School of Security Studies brought in the concept of 'securitization', in response to the traditional analysis of security. Moreover, well-known and long pre-existing phenomena, such as migration, have entered the security realm. This shift of focus of migration as a security issue has been addressed as "securitization of migration".[1] The arrival in Europe of large flows of migrants in the last few years, in fact, has been labeled as a 'threat' and a 'crisis' for the inhabitants of the host countries, leading to the implementation of extraordinary measures to cope with the problem. Yet, it could be argued that this characterization of migration in terms of threat, insecurity and emergency has left apart the humanitarian aspects of the 'crisis'.

This essay first analyzes the concept of "securitization", introduced by the Copenhagen School, followed by some of the critiques which arose against this theory, among which the need to reconceptualise humanitarianism as a sector of security. It will be demonstrated how humanitarianism is not to be thought as a distinct, separate section of security, which contradicts the security approach, but as a continuum of it. The humanitarian-security nexus will then be applied in a case

[1] Ibrahim, Maggie. "The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse". *International Migration, 43,* no. 5 (2005): 163-87

study concerning the Italian hotspots. Here the humanitarian actors, such as the NGOs working on the field, are not in opposition to the bordering practices going on there, but are drawn in the same field of security, care and protection.[2] This, however, does not exclude human rights violations inside the hotspots, violence and suffering at the borders or lack of the dignity migrants deserve as human beings.

Before we proceed, it is necessary to explain how the Copenhagen School of Security Studies contributed to the development of the security concept through the "securitization theory". Ole Wæver was the first one to elaborate the idea of securitization in 1995[3] and a few years later, in 1998, with the contribution of Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde a new securitization model was developed, in opposition to the realist view of security.[4] In this model, security is described as a socially constructed process, which needs to follow precise steps. In other words, not everything can be securitized. In order for an issue to enter the security realm, in fact, it needs to go through the three stages of the so-called 'securitizing process'.[5] First, a fundamental requirement for securitization to be successful is the presence of an existential threat to a referent object, that is to say an object that is being threatened and needs protection.

The second precondition is the existence of a sufficiently powerful actor, who, as securitizing actor, will put in place the extraordinary measures necessary to deal with the issue. Finally, the population needs to accept the extraordinary measures applied, which for this reason need to be validly justified by the securitizing actor.[6] In light of these premises, it can be observed that the Copenhagen School's analysis is based on the presumption that a security threat exists because of a discourse, which marks it as such. Security is therefore conceived as a 'speech act'. For instance, Wæver states that: "in this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying the word, something is done."[7] Therefore, by simply naming the issue as a security threat, something is done, and the same issue immediately becomes a security one.

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[2] Chouliaraki, Lilie, and Myria Georgiou. "Hospitability: The Communicative Architecture of Humanitarian Securitization at Europe's Borders." Journal of Communication, 67, no. 2 (2017): 159-80.

[3] Wæver Ole. "Securitization and Desecuritization", in *On Security*, ed. R. Lipschutz, New York: Columbia University Press, (1995), 46–86.

[4] Buzan Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap De Wilde. "Security: a new framework for analysis". Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2013

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Wæver, Ole. (1995). "Securitization and Desecuritization", p. 55

Moreover, the members of the Copenhagen School discern five different areas where the securitizing process takes place: environmental, political, societal, economic and military. They specify, on this purpose, that the nature of the existential threat is different for each one of these sectors.[8]

To sum up, the securitization theory has to do with a securitizing actor (who?), who through a speech act (how?) securitizes an issue representing a threat (what?) to a referent object (whom?), this way an unpoliticized issue is transformed into a security issue, which, in turn, accounts for the implementation of extraordinary measures.

The securitization theory has received numerous critiques. However, for the purpose of this essay, only two of them will be considered. The first one is elaborated by Watson, who argues that the five security sectors identified by Buzan and his colleagues are useful to explain the different processes taking place when talking of cyber-secuity, state security, social security and societal security, however he claims the necessity of bringing in the humanitarian as an additional sector of security.[9] This would mean broadening the spectrum of validity of the securitization theory by considering humans, their life and their dignity as possible referent objects, instead of taking into consideration only states and societies. Humanitarianism, as outlined by Watson, could be described as a separate area of security with its own logic and procedures: firstly, the identification of what constitutes an existential threat for the referent objects differs depending on who the securitizing actor is, so threats could be seen in poverty such as in loss of human life.

Secondly, the implementation of the extraordinary measures is also different according to specific cases, it can vary from neutral and impartial delivery of relief to military interventions. Thirdly, when speaking of humanitarian practices of securitization, it is sometimes difficult to draw a line between exceptional practices and institutionalized ones.[10] In short, addressing humanitarianism as a separate area of security with its own procedures and logics uncovers some of the gaps of the securitization theory: its lack in considering referent objects other than states or societies,[11] its exclusion of forms of governments different from democratic and

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[8] Buzan et al. "Security", p. 27

[9] Watson, Scott. "The 'human' as referent object? Humanitarianism as securitization". *Security Dialogue,* 42, no. 1 (2011): 3-20.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Hansen, Lene and Nissenbaum Helen. "Digital disaster, cyber security and the Copenhagen School". *International Studies Quarterly,* 53, no 4 (2009): 1160

domestic ones[12] and the questionable gap between normal political and emergency measures.[13] However, as it will be explained later on in this paper, the line, which according to Watson separates humanitarianism form other security practices, will become blurred when dealing with migration, creating a humanitarian-security nexus.

The second critique, is developed by the Paris School, especially by Didier Bigo, and recalls the distinction between usual political measures and emergency measures outlined before. Bigo argues that "some (in)securitization moves performed by bureaucracies, the media, or private agents are so embedded in routines that they are never discussed and presented as an exception but, on the contrary, as the continuation of routines".[14] This means that in some cases securitization practices transform from exceptional to institutionalized because of the success of the adopted measures or because of the necessity to keep them in place for a longer time, and therefore do no longer need a speech act to be justified or explained. Among these, we can identify "highly institutionalized security responses [such as] emergency medical care [or] fire departments"[15] and humanitarian security issues.[16] This is also the case of EU hotspots, which will be analyzed in the following paragraph.

Italy and Greece have been facing the problem of irregular migration for decades, but since 2013, the number of people trying to irregularly cross the sea and dying during the journey has significantly increased. This phenomenon has led to the necessity of implementing rescue operations to reduce the number of deaths. Rescue vessels belonging to both governmental and nongovernmental organization were helping migrants travelling on dinghies unable to reach the shores of Europe autonomously. As a consequence of the frequent disembarkations of huge groups of migrants, especially in the south of Italy and in Greece between 2013 and 2015, measures to manage the situation on land had to be implemented. Usually, first thing after arrival, migrants would be subjected to a basic medical control and would

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[12] Wilkinson, Claire. "The Copenhagen School on tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is securitization theory usable outside Europe?". *Security Dialogue,* 38, no 1 (2007): 5–25.

[13] Stritzel, Holger. "Towards a theory of securitization: Copenhagen and beyond". *European Journal of International Relations,* 13, no 3 (2007): 367

[14] Bigo, Didier and Tsoukala Anastassia. "Understanding (in)security", in Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal regimes after 9/11 (Oxon, Routledge, 2008), p. 5.

[15] Watson. "The 'human' as referent object?", p. 8

[16] Ibid.

be given food and drinks by NGOs' actors.[17] After that, Frontex, along with members of the Italian or Greek police, depending on the country of arrival, would start to register each person by asking basic information, such as name, date of birth and country of origin followed by more formal acts, such as fingerprinting, to divide those who could be granted asylum by submitting a form requiring for international protection and those who need to be expelled or redirected to Centers for Identification and Expulsion (CIE). [18]

However, a conspicuous number of individuals did not accept to be fingerprinted and managed to escape Italy or Greece without leaving any trace of their passage through these countries and reach their families or friends in other European countries. Yet, these same countries, started to complain about the malfunctioning fingerprinting practices and the arrival in their territories of unregistered migrants, which, due to the lack of these information, could not be sent back to the first European country they entered, as stated in the Dublin regulation.[19] In spite of the requirement to fingerprint each single individual and put all the identification data in a database called 'Eurodac', accessible to all EU members, Italy and Greece were not able to manage the situation.[20] Therefore, on the 15th of July 2015, the European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, presented a plan to the EU members for the implementation of institutionalized transit points for migrants called 'hotspots'.[21] This 'hotspot approach' called for the opening of structures, where the European Asylum Support Office, Europol, and Frontex, together with other EU agencies, such as EASO and Eurojust, would help the frontline Member States, receiving significant pressure from migrant flaws, in the previously explained identification process, including registration and fingerprinting.[22] The aim of the hotspots would be to avoid the uncontrolled and illegal movement of unregistered migrants on the European territory.

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[17] Amnesty International. "Hotspot Italy: How EU's Flagship Approach Leads To Violations Of Refugee And Migrant Rights". [online] London: Amnesty International Ltd, (2016), p. 11.

[18] Ibid.

[19] European Union: Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 29 February 2013, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L. 180/31, 29.6.2013

[20] Ibid.

[21] European Parliament Policy Department, "The Hotspot Approach To Managing Exceptional Migratory Flows – A study", (2016).

[22] European Council on Refugees and Exiles, "The implementation of the hotspots in Italy and Greece - A study", December 2016, p. 10

Because of the numerous agencies acting inside the hotspots and because of the lack of a hierarchy among these agencies, a coordination process for the operations is used. The EU Regional Task Force (EURTF) is the one coordinating the actors' work in the field.[23] Each EU Agency, then, has a different specific job. *Frontex* firstly deals with the registration issues, finding out the country of origin of each person, taking fingerprints and uploading the data on 'Eurodac'. Secondly, it conducts interviews to migrants to gather information on smuggling phenomena. Finally, the Agency conducts the operations concerning the returns of people, who do not meet the criteria to obtain asylum. *Europol* works to gather intelligence about organized crime, smugglers and terrorists, forwarding the information to the national authorities.[24] *Eurojust* is the Agency coordinating issues regarding investigations and prosecutions involving more than one Member State; it works in close contact with the competent authorities.[25] Lastly, *EASO,* deals with those people identified as meeting the criteria to obtain the asylum in Europe and their relocation.[26]

Until now we analyzed the "mandate of security" owned by EU Agencies and members of the army forces or police. However, in addition to the need of security, another aspect needs to be brought to light: the requirement of care for migrants as human beings.[27] Indeed, Europe's response to the migration crisis is mostly approached by using the Copenhagen School's approach, that is to say, as a situation where a political community uses its power to deal with the existential threat posed by migrants and implements exceptional measures to handle the situation and protect European borders from this threat. "Securitization is today established as the dominant paradigm of Western government".[28]

However, at least in this case, securitization is not so easy to explain and it is not as clear-cut as simple military control. Borders should not be considered as a mere physical line to cross, that separates European territories from other parts of the world; instead they should be defined as places aimed to "rhetorically identify and control the (very) mobility of certain people, services and goods that operate

[23] European Commission, "Explanatory note on the "Hotspot" approach", July 2015, p. 1
[24] Ibid, p. 2
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid, p. 1
[27] Chouliaraki and Georgiou. "Hospitability" p. 159
[28] Ibid. p. 161

around its jurisdiction".[29] In Italy, this procedure of rhetorical control, as already outlined, takes place mainly in hotspots, where law enforcement units and Frontex categorize new arrivals by their country of origin in order to grant the right of asylum to the ones deserving it and to detain and expel those who are not in the place to obtain it. In hotspots, however, the EU has tried to combine the 'mandate of care' and the 'mandate of security' by looking for an equilibrium between the work carried out by EU Agencies and the humanitarian intervention of NGOs.[30] As a matter of fact, humanitarian Agencies are also included in this process of securitization and play an important role by providing, for example, support with translations.[31] Humanitarianism, defined as an "act motivated by an altruistic desire to provide life-saving relief; to honor the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and indipendence; and to do more good than harm",[32] intertwines with the security practices in place in the hotspots; it is not a separate category of securitization, as Watson argued. In this way, the NGOs working on the field are not in opposition to the bordering practices going on in the hotspots, but are drawn into the same field of care, security and protection.

This discourse has led to the reconceptualization of some terms: *borders* are not only lines to cross anymore, but more extended zones where migrants are rescued, identified and later held or released according to their nationality.[33] *Migrants* are not only a threat to security for European countries or poor vulnerable subjects, but 'people with agency', that is to say people with a network constituted by family and friends, who they wish to reach, people owning an education and skills to be employed in the labor market. They need to be seen as subjects not objects.[34] The *crisis* is not to be considered only as a threat requiring extraordinary and exceptional measures to cope with the situation, which in some cases become the norm, by being institutionalized, such as the hotspots. As outlined in Ansems de Vries' work, together with Garelli, Elspeth and Tazzioli, it is also a crisis regarding subjects

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[29] Vaughan-Williams, Nick. "We are not animals": Humanitarian border security and zoopolitical spaces". *Political Geography,* 45, (2015), p. 6.

[30] Chouliaraki and Georgiou. "Hospitability". p. 160

[31] Ibid.

[32] Barnett, Michael and Thomas Weiss. "Humanitarianism: a brief history of the present", in *Humanitarianism in question: politics, power, ethics*, ed. M. Barnett, T. G. Weiss, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, (2008), p. 11

[33] Ansems de Vries Leonie, Garelli Glenda, Guild Elspeth, Tazzioli Martina. "Documenting the Humanitarian Migration Crisis in the Mediterranean". [online] London: Queen Mary University of London.

[34] Ibid.

prevented from passing and moving across the European borders in search of better opportunities than the ones they have in their countries or of international protection.[35] The concept of *securitization*, finally, needs to be expanded and the humanitarian needs to be embedded in it, creating a safety-security nexus.[36]

In spite of this relation between security and humanitarianism, global movements protecting human rights, such as Amnesty International, denounced the numerous human rights violations occurring inside the hotspots. These violations were identified in each of the three steps taking place at hotspots, that is to say, fingerprinting, screening for the separation of possible asylum-seekers from other irregular migrants and their following transference to other sites.[37] From now on we will be referring specifically to Italian hotspots.

According to the Dublin regulation,[38] migrants need to be fingerprinted in the first European country they enter, therefore this is the first practice performed in the hotspots. Some of the migrants follow the process without complaining, however, others oppose to this identification measure because they wish to reach other European countries and obtain international protection there and they are scared that by being fingerprinted they will eventually be sent back to Italy.[39] Amnesty International interviewed a conspicuous number of migrants, who described situations of brutal violence and torture with the aim of obliging them to follow the procedure. Among these human rights violations they reported being strongly and repeatedly beaten by the police, being tortured through electric shocks, being sexually humiliated and being inflicted pain to the genitals.[40]

During the screening procedures, people are also deprived of their rights as humans. First among all, the screening is made as soon as the migrants reach the hotspot, independently from the time of arrival. This means that these people are asked questions, which will significantly influence their future, immediately after a journey across the sea on board of a dinghy. A form is provided to each individual, where the reason for the journey to Italy is asked. The form, called 'foglio-notizie',

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[35] Ibid.

[36] Williams, Jill M. "The safety/security nexus and the humanitarianisation of border enforcement". *The Geographical Journal,* 182, no 1 (2016)

[37] Amnesty International. "Hotspot Italy"

[38] European Union: Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 29 February 2013, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L. 180/31, 29.6.2013

[39] Amnesty International. "Hotspot Italy", pp. 29-30.

[40] Ibid. p. 17

presents a multiple-choice among which appear "job search", "rejoining family", "fleeing from poverty" or "other reasons".[41] War, which is one of the most common reasons why people flee, will therefore belong to "other reasons".

Moreover, the 'foglio-notizie' is written in Italian, which most of the people do not understand. There is neither legal assistance nor support from international organizations in this process and many times the form is filled in by a police officer, leading hundreds of individuals to receive the '7 day decree', which orders them to leave Italy and Europe within a week as they do not meet the requisites to receive the title of asylum seekers.[42] This brings us to the last stage, when people receiving this expulsion paper are often left to their own at the border expecting them to leave. These practice of mass expulsion by the Italian authorities, especially with the implementation of the law Minniti-Orlando,[43] has been denounced by Amnesty International, arguing that it was ignoring the international law, the European human rights law and that it was violating the principle of non-refoulement as well as the forbiddance of mass expulsion.[44]

The theories and practices outlined until now could be applied to the specific case of Lampedusa, the first hotspot being opened in September 2015. Because of its position and of the number of people disembarking there, Lampedusa has become in the last decade a synonymous of 'border', not only of the Italian maritime frontier, but more generally of the entire European external borders. The island and its hotspot are therefore the place where the security and humanitarian "border play" we analyzed until now takes place. The two dynamics are present at any moment in the practices going on there. European Agencies and NGOs are always on the field and even if their scope may seem opposed, they are actually connected and intertwined, as they both contribute to create the practices and policies to deal with migration and border control. This reinforces the ideal of the humanitarian-security nexus. However, even here, many problems take place of people being treated as objects rather and subjects and being deprived of their rights. The Lampedusa hotspot regulation states that the maximum capacity is 250 people and the maximum amount of time for people to be held is 72 hours, however, because of the

[41] Ibid, p. 35. The form is printed by the police head office in each city, therefore there are slight changes in different cities

[42] Ansems de Vries et al, "Documenting the Humanitanitarian Migration"

[43] A law to accelerate the measures to contrast illegal migration. Available at: http://www.altalex.com/documents/leggi/2017/02/13/immigrazione-nuove-norme-sul-contrasto-ed-istituzione-di-sezioni -specializzate

[44] Amnesty International. "Hotspot Italy" p. 47

complications explained in the previous paragraphs, many of them remain in the hotspot for months, causing overcrowding[45] and constant violations of human rights.[46]

To sum up, it can be argued that the 'securitization theory' brought forward by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies is too narrow and could metaphorically represent just the point of an iceberg, which in turn is connected and interweaved to many other elements, such as the humanitarian one. Although the two realms of security/protection and humanitarian/care are in most of the cases in contrast to one another, in this analysis a possible nexus between the two is presented. Inside the hotspots, the European Agencies with the "mandate of security" work hand in hand with NGOs having the "mandate of care" and their jobs do not necessarily contradict one another, as they both aim to handle the problem of illegal migration in the best way possible. However, a paradoxical issue is presented when it comes to the way migrants are treated and to the systematical violations of human rights, which take place inside the hotspots. The stronger securitization of external borders of Europe through the 'hotspot approach' and the incapacity to properly deal with the situation could be revised and improved.

Many suggestions for improvement have been proposed, such as a revision of the Dublin Regulation, the sharing of responsibilities from other European countries, and an amendment for the relocation measures that will ensure more people the status of asylum-seekers; however many times things are easier said than done and the implementation of new security measures is not as straight-forward as it is usually thought.

[45] Ansems de Vries et al, "Documenting the Humanitanitarian Migration"
[46] Ibid.

TO WHAT EXTENT IS JOHN MACKINLAY CORRECT IN DESCRIBING MAO'S INSURGENCY AS THE "FIRST MODERN INSURGENCY"?

Nicolò Scremin

Mao Zedong's protracted people's uprising has represented an evolutionary milestone for theories of insurgency to the point that John Mackinlay even refers to it as the first modern insurgency. Within this picture, this essay seeks to explore and gauge such an assumption by analysing Mao's supposed distinctive contribution to the very idea of insurgency. Hence, the first section presents Mackinlay's rationale for deeming Mao's protracted war to be "the first modern insurgency". The second part assesses the novelty of Mao's teachings in relation to previous forms of uprising, while the last section ponders the legacy of Mao's prototype of insurgency over the last 80 years.

Introduction

Tools of politics since the dawn of time, insurgencies are intrinsic elements to the history of many countries and peoples. Although every insurgency is unique for it solely obeys the dynamics of a peculiar historical zeitgeists, certain uprisings have surely been more relevant than others. Not only did a number of rebellions mark the transition from one era to another; some also became icons and models to be emulated, adapted, and innovated by different groups to fit their struggles. In this respect, Mao Zedong's protracted people's uprising has represented an evolutionary milestone for theories of insurgency to the point that John Mackinlay even refers to it as the first modern insurgency. Within this picture, this essay seeks to explore and gauge such an assumption by analysing Mao's supposed distinctive contribution to the very idea of insurgency. Hence, the first section presents Mackinlay's rationale for deeming Mao's protracted war as "the first modern insurgency". The second part assesses the novelty of Mao's teachings in relation to previous forms of uprising, while the last section ponders over the legacy of Mao's prototype of insurgency over the last 80 years. By doing so, this investigation agrees with Mackinlay's belief that Mao's protracted war is the first modern insurgency. First, Mao's schemes allowed questions of asymmetric power to shifting the fulcrum from military tactics to

politics. Second, Mao's analytical models to mobilise and recruit the masses within the industrial domain were so innovative to the point they inspired several insurgent movements throughout the 20th century and, to a certain extent, today's "modern" times.

Two main clarifications

Before delving into Mao's precepts, it is paramount to make a number of clarifications, starting with the definition of insurgency. Despite primitive forms of insurgency that have been used to challenge organised society for more than 2000 years, the concept of "insurgency" firmly entered the military discourse only during the era of decolonisation due to the myriad of national liberation struggles that were waged on the borders of Western colonial empires at that time.[1] Since then, experts have accentuated three main characteristics of insurgency. First, insurgency is the expedient of the weaker side.[2] Second, it is the use of a mix of violent and nonviolent methods.[3] Third, insurgency is the exploitation of the environment in order to redress the military weakness.[4] Within this framework, for the sake of the analysis, this essay defines "insurgency" as a struggle between a non-ruling group and ruling authorities, where the former uses a combination of political resources and violent methods to destroy, reformulate, or challenge the legitimacy of the stronger power, exploiting the physical and virtual environment to redress the problem of military weakness.

A further necessary elucidation regards the concept of "modernity" and its impact on insurgencies. Often viewed as being in opposition to and representing a break from tradition, "modernity" is a phenomenon that first appeared in 18th century Western Europe and then expanded heterogeneously to the Americas and later to Asia and Africa. Fuelled by industrialisation and significant societal advances, the reach of "modernity" undermined many societies' premises, causing mixed feelings of rejection and desire for innovation.[5] Such sentiments were also inevitably reflected in the evolution of insurgent groups. As a number of societies

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[1] Moran, Danie. *Wars of National Liberation*. London: HarperCollins, 2006.

[2] Betz, David. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency". In *The International Studies Encyclopedia,* edited by Robert A. Denemark and Renée Marlin-Bennett, London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017.

[3] Moghadam, Assaf, Ronit Berger, and Polina Beliakova "Say Terrorist, Think Insurgent: Labeling and Analyzing Contemporary Terrorist Actors." *Perspective On Terrorism* 8, n. 5 (2014), 4.

[4] Mackinlay, John, and Alison Al-Baddawy Rethinking Counterinsurgency. *RAND Counterinsurgency Study 5 (2008)*, 1-63.

[5] Eisenstadt, S. Noah, "Modernity and modernization". *Sociopedia.isa, 2010*, 6-7.

underwent a process of modernisation, insurgents also benefited from the kind of progress granted by "modernity" – especially in technology, urbanisation, and mass communication. Conversely, within the same historical post-modern period, other groups fully rejected what they considered "modernity". They fiercely refused to align themselves with the "modern" peculiarities of their time, that is globalisation, and opted for old fashion forms of insurgencies as the Taliban case will show later on. Hence, not only does such a comparative analysis teach that the very idea of "modernity" is relative and differently internalised; it also suggests that "modernity" does not automatically entail the acquisition of "modern" tactics and methods of insurgency – something that might even prove the relevancy of Mao's scheme in today's world.

The "first modern insurgency"

Despite a plethora of other revolutionary styles to select — such as the Soviet model forged by Vladimir Lenin, Ernesto Che Guevara's *Foco* Theory or Carlos Marighella's model of urban guerrilla warfare, to name a few, Mackinlay shows no hesitation in considering Mao's formula of people's war as the first modern revolutionary model par excellence.

Mackinlay states that Mao's unique contribution to the evolution of insurgency was the introduction of "a political dimension into what had previously been a largely military affairs."[67] In modern society, insurgencies were mostly convoluted, unorganised mixtures of politics, culture and military tactics, just like the early Palestinian uprisings of the first few decades of the 20th century. Arguably for the first time, Mao elaborated a multidimensional approach that successfully combined the various facets of insurgency. In truth, as Mackinlay points out, Mao's strategy potently affected every level of action. Operationally, it featured a sturdy military struggle. Politically, it constructed subversive structures within the community. And psychologically, it exploited local grievances to mobilise the population.[8] More than that, Mackinlay believes that Mao's recognition of the population as the primary

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[6] Insurgency is indeed 80 percent political and only 20 percent military. As Betz notes, Mao's unique contribution was "figuring out how and with what to fill that 80 percent: mass subversion and political organization." (Betz, David. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency")

[7] Mackinlay, John. *The Insurgent Arcipelago*. London: Hurst & Co.,2009, 26.

[8] Ibid.

asset of modern landscape,[9] as well as his ability to mobilise the masses within the industrial domain, is what truly renders his struggle the first modern insurgency.[10]

In this respect, Mao was also the first to be fully successful in mobilising the masses in unprecedented numbers and his realisation of the centrality of the population derived from matters of wisdom, necessity, and opportunity. As Mackinlay recalls, at the early stages of his campaign, Mao's insurgency was highly unsuccessful.[11] Between 1927 and 1929, Mao and his Red Army were involved in a fruitless and draining campaign of attrition against the much stronger Guomindang forces (GMD) in the Jinggangshan region - a mountainous area ravaged by bandits and deserters. Trapped in such a hostile environment, not only did Mao's forces fail to obtain substantial strategic and tactical victories; they also struggled to survive.[12] But Mao's subsequent relocation to the Jiangxi region, an agricultural area densely populated, eventually allowed the leader to fully remodel his concept of operations, marking a decisive turning point in his campaign.[13]

Upon his arrival in the Jiangxi, Mao realised that survival and success relied on popular support. And China's environment provided him with the perfect opportunity to obtain this type of support. At the time, China suffered from a disrupted and decadent economy, prey of both foreign and local aristocratic rapacious exploitation.[14] Particularly in Jiangxi region, the peasantry had been enduring devastating famines and rising rents. Mao took advantage of such havoc to win over the local farmers, promising them land redistribution.[15] By doing so, Mao's new asset became the backing of the population rather than the possession of the territory.

Yet, the process of winning the "hearts and minds" of the local peasantry was not as immediate as it may seem. *Au contraire*, Mao gradually turned the population to his side through an intensive process of mass subversion and politicisation.[16] In other words, Mao understood that, in order to succeed, he was forced to redefine the

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[9] In fact, Mao's insurgency is also referred to as *People's War*, given the primacy of popular mobilisation throug propaganda to spiritually unify the insurgents and the guerrillas, creating a sea in which the insurgent-fish can swim undisturbed.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid. 16-17.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Betz, David. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency"

[15] Mackinlay, John. The Insurgent Arcipelago.

[16] Ibid. 15-26.

very essence of his armed forces. First, Mao acknowledged the necessity to clearly distinguish his fighters from the predatory militias that pillaged the area. As such, the Chinese leader instructed his units to treat each other and the local population with egalitarian ethos and respect.[17] Second, he guided the transition from military action to political participation, where the local peasantry would be provided with health and social services to earn their support.[18] Not only did this plan grant Mao the backing of the local population; it also gave birth to an unprecedented strategy to mobilising rural masses, whose dimension was even greater than the 1917 Russian urban revolution.[19] To Mackinlay, this innovative concept of operations represents the shift from the pre-modern era of insurgency to the modern era of insurgency.

The novelty of Mao's teachings

After illustrating Mackinlay's rationale, it is necessary to assess the novelty of Mao's teachings in relation to previous forms of insurgency. Whilst Mao's overall influence on revolutionary warfare is unquestionable, it is fair to state that most of what he has professed is far from innovative. In reality, most of his political thought is borrowed and elaborated from the works by Sun Tzu, the legendary 5th century figure, who wrote *The Art of War*.[20] Or could Mao's ideas have been shaped by the existence of other revolutionaries who in many ways anticipated his writings. In addition to Carl von Clausewitz, two further examples can be traced in the Italian 19th century revolutionaries Giuseppe Mazzini and Carlo Bianco. Founder of the insurrectional political movement *La Giovine Italia*,[21] Mazzini believed in the need of a popular effort to liberate Italy. Author of *Rules for the Conduct of Guerrilla Bands*, [22]Bianco championed insurgency as the main tool to free Italy from foreign domination – highlighting the importance of the terrain, hit-and-run attacks, intelligence gathering, and the involvement of the population led by political elites.

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[17] Ibid. 19-26.
[18] Ibid. 18-26.
[19] Ibid. 15-26.
[20] Boorman, Scott A., Boorman, Howard L. Mao Tse-tung and the Art of War. The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. Nov.1, 1964. P.129-137.
[21] Mazzini, Giuseppe. *La Giovine Italia*. Nuova Edizione a cura di Mario Menghini, Project Gutenberg, 1902.
[22] Bianco, Carlo. Della Guerra Nazionale D'insurrezione Per Bande, Applicata All'Italia. Project Gutenberg, 1830.

Nevertheless, Mao's conceptualization of insurgency encapsulates three main innovative elements that marked a turning point in the evolution of insurgency. As already mentioned, Mao's unique contribution to insurgency was to place the population at the centre of his campaign, recognising the importance of securing its support. Before Mao, insurgency was almost exclusively a military affair. Insurgents used to exploit remote wilderness to over-extend their adversaries and defeat much stronger forces on their own terms.[23] Mao rejected the classic wilderness-dependent guerrilla warfare paradigm and redefined the concept of insurgency to be able to survive in the populated agricultural areas of the Jiangxi region.[24] In Jiangxi, he came to rely on the power of popular support rather than on the military exploitation of terrain. Recognising the interdependence of the people, the insurgents, and the government,[25] Mao realised that the support of the population was integral to the strategic centre of gravity to both the insurgents and the governmental forces.[26] In other words, the Chinese leader learned that the winning side would be the one that is able to secure control over the population, for whoever captures the hearts and minds of the people wins the struggle. This brings to Mao's second unique contribution to the phenomenon of insurgency: the creation of a strategy to mobilise the population on an industrial scale. Previous insurrections had also involved population — for instance, Lenin's revolutionary grand strategy relied on mobilising the urban proletariat.[27] However, it is precisely the massive number of people involved in the Chinese struggle that distinguished Mao's people war from other versions of insurgency.[28]

The successful massive mobilisation of the population was strategically crafted. First, Mao's strategy required the formulation of a sound and attracting political cause.[29] Stating that, *"without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail,"*[30] the very leader understood the importance of acting in pursuit of a popular objective, as insurgency stems and is supported by the masses.[31] Without the latter, guerrilla

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[23] Mackinlay, John, and Alison Al-Baddawy Rethinking Counterinsurgency. 6.
[24] Mackinlay, John. The Insurgent Arcipelago. 17.
[25] A sort of elaboration of Clausewitz's trinity theory.
[26] *Ibid.* 20-21.
[27] It is important to note that also the Russian revolution involved a significant amount of people. However, it was a Coup d'etat more than it was a popular uprising.
[28] Mackinlay, John. The Insurgent Arcipelago. 19.
[29] As previously mentioned, Mao was able to exploit the grievances felt by local peasantry by promising them land reform.
[30] Mao, Zedong, and Samuel B. Griffith. *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: BN, 2007, 43.
[31] *Ibid*. 44.

warfare would merely be a powerless weapon. Certainly, others before Mao had stressed the importance of the "cause".[32] Clausewitz, for instance, wrote that people are animated by some passionate causes, while Thomas Edward Lawrence spoke of the necessity of a cause to motivate the insurgents.[33] But Mao was the first to realise that a strong political cause was not sufficient alone to win over the population, for mass subversion and politicisation were equally important.

Accordingly, Mao's second strategic step to mobilise the people was the transition from a military to a political campaign. Turning into a political organisation, Mao's army became the home of full-fledged political actors meant to educate and convert the local population to the Communist cause.[34] In order to succeed, the community was also granted with health and social services, including assisting farmers in their manual labour. As a result, the local people became Mao's force multiplier, offering him protection, intelligence, supplies, and logistical support.[35] With time, the outcome proved to be extremely fruitful. Not only were Mao's forces able to secure their territorial bases, they also managed to recruit and mobilise local masses in unprecedented numbers.[36]

Lastly, the third novelty of Mao's insurgency was the protractedness[37] of the conflict. Metaphorically, old-fashioned guerrilla warfare was considered as "a simple cat and mouse affair", a military technique exploited by small irregular units to constantly harass a larger, well-equipped and organised army, just like in the American Revolution.[38] By contrast, Mao's insurgency was more akin to a cancer in a living organism. It started as just a few malignant cells, slowly metastasised throughout the body finally killing the organism.[39] Precisely, Mao divided his protracted people's war in three stages that are labelled: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, and strategic offensive.[40] Phase one called for the insurgents' survival in

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[32] Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. Wordsworth Editions Limited. 1997.

[33] Betz, David. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency"

[34] Mackinlay, John. The Insurgent Arcipelago. 18.

[35] Ibid. 17.

[36] Ibid. 17-19.

[37] Protractedness is important for insurgents, for it allows them to organise, consolidate and strengthen vis-à-vis much larger and more powerful opposing forces. In fact, as Robert Taber notes, insurgents have everything to gain from a prolonged conflict, as it provides weapons, time, space, and weakens the enemy both physically and morally. (Taber, Robert. *War of the flea: the classic study of guerrilla warfare*. Potomac Books, Inc., 2002, 51).

[38] Mackinlay, John. The Insurgent Arcipelago. 23.

[39] Betz, David. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency"

[40] O'Neill, Bard E. Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Potomac Books, Inc., 2005, 50.

face of the strong enemy. The main goals were political organisation, mass mobilisation, and attrition. Here, the enemy was allowed to spread through the rural territory to increase its vulnerability vis-à-vis the insurgents' low-level violence - consisting of small-scale attacks intended to tire and slowly weaken the enemy.[41]

Envisioned as the expansion stage, the second phase witnessed the increasing role of guerrilla warfare, the deeper penetration of Mao's insurgents within the population, the organisational evolution of his forces,[42] and the development of base areas[43] (territories encircled by the enemy). Finally, the strategic offensive phase, or mobile warfare,[44] required a transformation of Mao's troops from guerrilla units into regular forces able to take the initiative and attack the enemy, using hybrid tactics.[45] Confronting the enemy with its own weapons, which were previously seized by the insurgents, Mao's soldiers were able to conduct a protracted struggle on two fronts, the countryside and the cities, where inspired and/or indoctrinated people commenced popular uprisings.[46] [47]

Within this picture, it can be argued that Mao succeeded where others failed: he gave rise to a genuine and protracted people's war. He successfully used the population as his major bellicose resource. And, perhaps more importantly, he fathered an innovative methodology for mobilising the masses in unprecedented numbers through a combination of mass subversion, politicisation, and an attractive political cause. This unique concept of operations is what distinguishes Mao's insurgency from other cases, like the Algerian revolution[48] and the Mexican peasant uprisings,[49] which were, in nature, considerably more convoluted and divisive.

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[41] Taber, Robert. War of the flea: the classic study of guerrilla warfare. 49.

[42] O'Neill, Bard E. Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. 53

[43] Mao, Zedong, and Samuel B. Griffith. *On Guerrilla Warfare*.107.

[44] Staudenmaier, William. "Vietnam, Mao and Clausewitz. Parameters," *Journal of the US Army War College* 7, n.1.

[45] Taber, Robert. War of the flea: the classic study of guerrilla warfare. 50 -51.

[46] Ibid.

[47] An important element integral to all the three phases was violence. According to Thomas Marks and Paul Rich, Mao's forces exploited violence to achieve a twofold objective. On the one hand, they used it to neutralise the armed capacity of the enemy. On the other hand, they strategically exploited it "to carve out the space necessary for the political activities of (alternative) state-building achieved through mass mobilisation and construction of capacity." (Marks, Thomas A,, and Paul, B., Rich. "Back to the future – people's war in the 21st century." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23, n. 3 (2017), 411).

[48] In Algeria, the French's counterinsurgency succeeded in isolating the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) leadership from support at local level.

[49] The Mexican peasant rebellions failed to lead to the creation of a successful revolutionary party and ended up with as an anachronistic rebellion overridden by urban political machines controlled by middle class.

Mao's on-going relevance

To properly evaluate whether Mao's people's war has really inspired a new era of insurgency, it is not sufficient to assess the novelty of Mao's teachings in relation to previous forms of insurgency. Rather, it is important to ponder over the imprints his precepts have left on the successive generations of insurgents.

Unsurprisingly, the question of Mao's relevance is a considerable source of debate. To pundits like Bard O'Neill, Mao's model has indubitably inspired insurgent movements. While different insurgents may adapt, innovate, and manipulate the elements of the strategy to fit their struggles, Mao's general blueprint is present and always identifiable, argues O'Neill.[50] Even today's world, where modern and post-modern societies coexist, it is possible to spot Maoist-type insurgencies alongside Post-Maoist versions. For example, Maoist warfare still inspires the guiding political ideology of rural insurgency within the Communist Party in Nepal, and in Peru, with Sendero Luminoso.[51]

But the most notable example in history is, probably, the case of the People's Army of Vietnam. During the almost 20 year conflict, under the leadership of General Võ Nguyên Giap, the Communist North backed the Southern National Liberation Front's military wing, the People's Liberation Armed Front, better know as Viet Cong. Initially, the North began an underground campaign as Southern Communists orchestrated public demonstrations coupled by targeted assassinations and abductions meant to terrorise the Southern government.[52] With the support of the North, the Viet Cong received supplies via the Ho Chi Minh Trail,[53] regrouping themselves into the National Liberation Front in 1960.

As they grew stronger, in a purely Maoist fashion, the Viet Cong fostered recruiting and established larger guerrilla units. Progressively, such units managed to secure control over numerous rural areas, inflicting serious strategic losses on the US Army.[54] Characterized by the 1968 US-led Tet Offensive and the full escalation with the North, the final phase of the conflict marked the transition of the guerrillas into regular units, set to conquest the South.[55] Similarly to Mao's struggle, the Viet

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[50] O'Neill, Bard E. Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. 53

[51] Rich, Paul B,. and Isabelle Duyvesteyn. The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. 8.

[52] Ibid. 47-48.

[53] Ibid. 48.

[54] Taber, Robert. War of the flea. 92 -53.

[55] Laqueur, Walter. Guerrilla Warfare. A Historical & Critical Study. Transaction Publishers, 1976, 275.

Cong could rely on the support of the local people –something the US Army could hardly match as public support at home steadily vanished. Operationally and psychologically, the people's backing was pivotal, for they provided fighters with constant protection and assistance. In the long run, such a tremendous advantage vis-à-vis the US Army allowed the Viet Cong to resist and win the war. For these reasons, the case of South Vietnam shows how Mao's model can be crucial for insurgencies. It combines both military and political factors. It places the masses at the centre of the struggle. It uses an attractive political cause to trigger recruitment and mass mobilisation. And it creates the conditions for the type of public support that allows for the protraction of the struggle.

Nonetheless, other experts beg to differ from the assumption that Mao's model is an instrumental element for every insurgency. As Paul Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn note, by the late 1960s, it was evident that not every uprising would be based on the paradigm of the people's war. As such, other models increasingly became valuable alternatives to Mao's,[56] like, for instance, the one proposed by Che Guevara. The Argentinian revolutionary, indeed, criticised and ended up rejecting Mao's protracted warfare in favour of small-dedicated groups of fighters. In particular, he believed that selected units of *focoist* armed-missionaries could compensate for the long-drawn-out process of political and military mobilisation of the peasant masses.[57]

Besides, even after the Vietnam's war, the Maoist-inspired insurgencies appeared to be on the decline. On the one hand, the Cold War increasingly diminished the centrality of the local population and its support, as the United States and Soviet Union continued their rivalry in the form of proxy insurgencies in failing states. Thus, insurgents no longer needed the population as a war asset, for it was the two superpowers that constantly supplied them with food, funds and weapons.[58]

On the other hand, macro-phenomena such as modernisation and urbanisation led to the undermining of the Maoist precepts of peasant-based protracted war.[59] By

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[56] Rich, Paul B,. and Isabelle Duyvesteyn. The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. New York: Routledge, 2014, 5-6.

[57] In contrast to Mao, Che Guevara asserted that "it is not necessary to wait until all the conditions for making a revolution exist" because the insurrection's act would create them. (Mackinlay, John. *The Insurgent Arcipelago*. 36)

[58] Mackinlay, John. The Insurgent Arcipelago. 27-28.

[59] Rich, Paul B,. and Isabelle Duyvesteyn. The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. 8.

the late 1990s, the spread of globalisation across the world has fundamentally changed the nature of the conflict area, altering the lives of isolated communities and shaping the environment in which insurgencies take place. Mackinlay claims that the pressure of globalisation has given rise to a new globalised version of insurgency, which, in turn, has marked a shift from the Maoist to the Post-Maoist era of insurgencies.[60] To Mackinlay, global insurgencies are, in many respects, the exact opposite of Maoist versions. For instance, global insurgents are part of an international community rather than a population that is definite by territory; their objectives are global rather than national; their organisation is an unstructured network rather than vertical and structured; the subversion process lies mainly in the virtual dimension and is bottom-up rather than top-down.[61]

That asserted, there are two main observations to be made. First, although the international scenario is dynamic, it is fair to state that the Maoist model still continues to better suit certain types of insurgencies. The very Mao was initially inspired and opted for the approach used in 1917 in Russia but ended up learning that Lenin's urban dynamics could not apply to the Chinese rural environment. Likewise, whilst many have elevated or preferred Che Guevara's model to Mao's, the latter approach turned China into a Communist country, while the *foco*'s model botched. As Mackinlay claims, Che Guevara's model failed to establish a rival trend and Mao's people war remains inextricably at the centre of the insurgency's theory.[62]

Second, although it may be less relevant, Mao's protracted people's war model has not disappeared. As shown in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Taliban have precisely applied the Maoist strategic defensive and stalemate phases.[63] As the Taliban resistance started with the strategic defensive in 2002, the insurgents reorganised themselves, managing to reconstitute, recruit, train, and develop intelligence and operation networks. In 2004, they entered the strategic stalemate phase vis-à-vis the coalition forces. In this period, the Taliban carried out attacks to demoralise and deter foreign forces, undermine reconstruction, and weaken the

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[60] Mackinlay, John. The Insurgent Arcipelago. 27-28.

[61] *Ibid.* 161-162.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Over the years, the Taliban have carried out a multidimensional struggle – political, economic, social, and military – winning and coercing popular support, the quintessence of insurgency as Mao has shown. Today, 13 percent of the districts in Afghanistan ((53/407) are under the control or influence of the Taliban. Particularly, in a purely Maoist fashion, they have been able to set up alternative social, political and cultural institutions, taking the control over the population through a combination of coercive violence and effective non-violence activities.

government to slowly replace it with Taliban institutions in numerous rural areas. Finally, in 2008, the Taliban entered the strategic counteroffensive stage, where they perpetrated hit-and-run operations and used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) extensively.[64]

All in all, whilst recognising that the importance of Mao is bound to diminish in line with rapid societal changes, it should also be acknowledged that his teachings are still visible. Not only did they influence several insurgent movements throughout the 20th century; even if perhaps to a limited extent, they have proven to be still relevant today's world. And it is for these reasons, namely Mao's model's novelty, versatility and longevity, that one can claim that Mackinlay is right, for Mao's insurgency can be deemed the first modern insurgency.

Conclusion

This essay has attempted to shed light upon the distinctive contribution brought to insurgency by Mao, in order to determine whether his protracted people's war has truly marked a new era of insurgency. It has argued that Mackinlay is right in considering Mao's insurgency as the first modern insurgency, for it has allowed insurgents to answer the question of asymmetric power through the transition from military strategy/tactics to politics. Compared to previous forms of insurgency, Mao's unique contribution was to recognise the population as the primary asset of modern landscape, while fathering a strategy to mobilise and recruit the masses in unprecedented numbers through a combination of mass subversion and politicisation fuelled by attractive political cause and strategic use of violence. Furthermore, Mao's protracted war model has transcended Communism, inspiring insurgents worldwide. Though perhaps to a limited extent, the case of the Afghan Taliban proves that Mao's model can still be relevant vis-à-vis today's "modern" world.

[64] Khan, Ehsan Mehmood "A Strategic Perspective on Taliban Warfare." *Small Wars Journal* (2010), 5-6.

THE EFFICIENCY OF DETERRENCE IN AN ANARCHICAL WORLD ORDER

Joost Tillemans

This paper tries to explain what deterrence is, when it is successful and whether these successes are still achievable in contemporary society. In answering these questions I have explained the deterrence theory and the various related elements needed to be taken into account when researching the phenomena. I have addressed two main points of critique used in the debate against the effectiveness of deterrence, subsequently used to explain why deterring a terrorist organization is a bad idea, as the big 'threat' would only empower the organisation.

Introduction

In 1940 a highly influential memorandum was written by the physics Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, both refugees from Nazi Germany. The memorandum gave an indication of the potential lethality of a nuclear bomb and the relative simplicity of its possible development. The secret memorandum was a recommendation for British strategists to start the production of the bomb as soon as possible. Frisch and Peierls emphasized that the bomb would be too destructive for British use, but based their advice on the concept of deterrence: the knowledge about the bomb in Britain rose the possibility that Nazi Germany would be able to develop a similar threat, but they would never dare to use it if both parties had the same destructive capabilities. So was the idea.[1]

Nuclear deterrence was, however, a failure during the second World War. The Maud report followed up the memorandum and reached the US shortly later, which in turn lead to the development of the bombs later destroying Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The destructiveness was undoubtedly accomplished, but using the bombs was a diplomatic blunder. The Japanese never possessed nuclear capabilities, so using the bomb wasn't an action of deterrence but of compellence.[2]

[1] Brown, A., & Arnold, L. (2010). The Quirks of Nuclear Deterrence.*International Relations, 24*(3), 293-312.

[2] Brown, A., & Arnold, L. (2010). The Quirks of Nuclear Deterrence.*International Relations, 24*(3), 293-312.

Deterrence is, in contradiction to the somewhat similar concept of compellence, a defensive position in world politics. Deterrence prevents other actors from taking action from a position of power, while compellence is the overreaction to stop certain events from occurring or to change the status quo.[3]

After the end of World War II the US did shift their strategy from winning wars (compellence) to actively avoiding them (deterrence), this marked the beginning of the Cold War. The strategy of deterrence uses the fear of others to the advantage of the powerful,[4] the result was that both superpowers actively tried to be the most powerful by further developing their nuclear arsenal.

This concept of deterrence was relatively successful between the clashing superpowers during the Cold War, but is facing more and more critique since the collapse of USSR. The bipolar world order, dominated by two power blocks, has changed to a way more anarchistic system. How contemporary society is currently being ruled is academically not agreed upon, either by unipolarity,[5] multipolarity[6] and nonpolarity,[7] but changes in power relations have likely affected the efficiency of the deterrence.

The best proof of the failure of deterrence was 11 September 2001, marked in history as the day when the most lethal terrorist attack ever occurred. The attack on the twin towers was the first major attack on US soil since World War II, making it painfully clear that military superiority wasn't longer enough to deter the new enemies of the post-Cold War era.[8] The question rising here is whether the attack on the twin towers indicates the definite end of deterrence or simply a failure in the proper execution of the concept. This brings me to the following research question: *What is deterrence and can any actor in the international system be deterred?*

In doing so I will first further elaborate on the concept of deterrence, including the necessities of effective deterrence. To subsequently apply this to ideas and practical examples of deterrence successes and failures.

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[3] Schelling, T. C. (2008). Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword. Yale University Press.

[4] Brodie, B. (1946). War in the atomic age. The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, 21-70.

[5] Krauthammer, C. (1990). The unipolar moment. *Foreign affairs*, *70*(1), 23-33.

[6] Kegley, C. W., & Raymond, G. A. (1992). Must we fear a post-cold war multipolar system?. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *36*(3), 573-585.

[7] Haass, R. N. (2008). The age of nonpolarity: what will follow US dominance. *Foreign Affairs*, 44-56.

[8] Long, A. G. (2008). Deterrence: From Cold War to long war: Lessons from six decades of RAND Deterrence Research (Vol. 636). Rand Corporation.

Defining (Effective) Deterrence

Deterrence is, as briefly introduced, a mind-set forced by one actor upon another. In this state of mind the deterred party is by threats prevented from taking action against the powerful. Freedman, who has been academically influential in researching the relevance of deterrence in a post 9/11 world, has further clarified the definitions of deterrence and compellence.[9] Freedman distinguishes between a controlling and a consensual approach of deterrence. Consent involves deterrence without the necessity of force. Control is the strategy of applying force to deter the other actor. Both forms of deterrence try to persuade the deterred not to perform a specific act, where compellence persuades the compelled to perform an act in favour of the powerful.

Deterrence uses fear to prevent an actor from taking action while compellence, as said, uses fear to oblige an actor to take action, per example to retreat or surrender during wartime.[10]

The differentiation between deterrence and compellence is in practice a lot harder to make, and during conflicts they often occur simultaneously and inseparably. But the distinction is worth making nonetheless, as it is believed that a party is a lot harder to persuade when already involved in combat. It is assumed that parties accept more losses during wartime in comparison to a situation where they are not yet involved in the violence. It is also experienced more legitimate to use force when defending the status quo compared to an attempt to change it.[11]

The use of deterrence can be either strategic or internalized. Strategic deterrence is an active strategy by the deterrent, de deterring party explicitly threatens the deterred and the deterred knows what reaction will follow if they cross this red line. Internalized deterrence on the other hand happens without an explicit threat by the deterrent, but the deterred actors knows that possible losses are too big if the deterrent reacts and thus decides to withhold from further aggression.[12]

Both of those strategies are based on the relations of power. Power is the ability to impose your will upon the other actor coercively . And the actor enjoying the greatest power is thus in the position to deter or compel other actors. During the cold war deterrence was most obvious and influential for world politics.

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[9] Freedman, L. (2004). *Deterrence*. Polity.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Morgan, P. M. (2003). *Deterrence now* (Vol. 89). Cambridge University Press.
[12] Freedman, L. (2004). *Deterrence*. Polity.

The cold war was driven by Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and was thus a situation of mutual deterrence, as both parties had developed their nuclear arsenal to such an extent that they had to admit to the vulnerable position they were in. For effective deterrence plenty of power to control the other is necessary, as is the needed ability to survive potential counterattacks when taking action.[13] The latter was the reason why none of the actors could control the other, but also assured a relatively peaceful era. Power relations have, however, significantly changed since the fall of the USSR, and so might have the effectiveness of deterrence in general. So why and when is deterrence effective? And can this concept still be effectively used in contemporary society?

Before elaborating on deterrence successes or failures one last distinguishment needs to be made. As the theory and the strategy of deterrence should be seen as two different concepts. The theory is, as we know by now, based on intense conflict, rationality and credibility. How this mix of requirements is shaped in politics is based on the used strategy of deterrence. There can therefore be multiple strategies in trying to achieve a situation strived for, but all are based on the same theory.[14] Therefore a failure in the effectiveness of deterrence can be a misuse of a specific strategy rather than a failure of deterrence in general.

Within deterrence two main strategies can be differentiated, deterrence by punishment and by denial. The former is the most obvious one, the deterrent avoids the deterred from taking action by threatening with overreaction. The second strategy is even more defensive, in which the deterrent tries to prevent a move by taking extra security measures. The goal of deterrence by denial is thus to raise the costs of an attack for the deterred to such heights that attacking isn't worth the benefits anymore.[15]

Why Deterrence Worked and Still Works in Contemporary Society

In the cold war this strategy worked relatively good, as major direct clashes were non-existent due to the fact that none of the actors could permit a mutual destruction. Deterrence is never finished and thus never accomplished, we can therefore never know if a nuclear clash would have occurred if the USSR would not have fallen. In fact, some still argue that the cold war never ended end is still

[13] Gaddis, J. L. (2005). Strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of American national security policy during the Cold War. Oxford University Press.
[14] Morgan, P. M. (2003). *Deterrence now* (Vol. 89). Cambridge University Press.
[15] Jervis, R. (1979). Deterrence theory revisited. *World Politics*, *31*(02), 289-324.

ongoing.[16] At the same time, if direct clashes would have occurred then this might have been due to external circumstances or simply a bad strategy, not necessarily because of a failure of deterrence theory.

Judging whether deterrence is a success or a failure is therefore a contentious distinguishment. The only and easiest way to divide deterrence into successes or failures is by researching whether violent intervention was necessary, because the intend of deterrence is avoiding escalation.[17]

The cold war is thus a successful act of deterrence according to this judgment, and this situation can still be achieved as long as theoretical necessities and circumstances allow an effective strategy. According to Kaufmann three factors are necessary for effective deterrence, namely the deterrent's persuasion that his military power is sufficient, that the costs on the side of the deterred would be unacceptable and that the he is willing to take the action.[18]

An often heard critique against deterrence is that it is not applicable when facing rogue states, irrational dictators and various nuclear powers. A rogue state is hereby defined as a state disrespecting all kinds of international agreements and only striving for an aggressive policy to empower their leadership.[19] This statement is based on the assumption that those actors can't be deterred because of their irrationality and that the world has grown too complicated. Or as former CIA director Jim Woolsey stated shortly after the fall of the USSR:

"We have slain the big dragon, but a myriad of little serpents have sprung up in its place"[20]

The main argument is that those serpents value nothing but violence and thus can't be threatened. This is, however, often contradicted. Colby points out that even the leaders of the countries most feared, like North-Korea and Iraq, value their position in power and would never irrationally put that at risk.[21] Waltz even goes as far as arguing that Iran should become a nuclear superpower to ensure stability.[22]

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[16] The Atlantic (August 2015). The Cold War Never Really Ended.

[17] Danilovic, V. (2002). When the stakes are high. *Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press*.

[18] Kaufmann, W. W. (1989). The requirements of deterrence. In *US Nuclear Strategy* (pp. 168-187). Palgrave Macmillan UK

[19] Chomsky, N. (2015). Rogue states: The rule of force in world affairs. Haymarket Books.

[20] Nelan, B., & Jackson, J. O. (1993). A new world for spies. *Time*, *5*, 28-31.

[21] Colby, E. (2007). Restoring deterrence. *Orbis*, *51*(3), 413-428.

[22] Waltz, K. N. (2012). Why Iran should get the bomb: Nuclear balancing would mean stability. *Foreign Aff.*, *91*,

Also, these states still have enough to lose whenever the incumbent does cross a red line, per example by threatening strongholds and government officials. The leading idea here is that every opponent values something, which can always be threatened.

It seems odd to assume that these kind of states are relatively rational in their decisions. But it is important to note that comparable statements about the irrationality of the USSR have also been made during the Cold War, which was perceived to be at least as aggressive as states like Iran, and even then deterrence proved functional.[23]

Another critique on deterrence is that is it too defensive to face rogue states and terrorist organizations. It is argued that this defensive policy would give terrorist organizations too much freedom when the theory of deterrence is applied to counter-terrorism. Deterrence is defensive in principle, but it is a misunderstanding to think that deterrence gives violent organizations too much freedom. Deterrence is based on a clearly defined credible threat supported by sufficient military capabilities. The only thing determining the defensiveness of deterrence is thus the tolerance of the deterrent. If the red line set by the deterrent only tolerates minimum actions and threatens to react with crashing force, then deterrence is still relatively aggressive in its eventual outcome. This is exactly what happened after 9/11. Al-Qaida clearly crossed the red line set by the US, which resulted in the United States' major war on terror. Deterrence is defensive but not passive, as long as red lines are clearly set and threats credible then any aggression can be justified according to his theory, but only if a counterattack proved necessary.[24]

However, the assumption that this strategy will be effective against terrorism is based on multiple theoretical and strategical flaws, as I will show in the next section.

Why Terrorists Can't Be Deterred

The terrorist attack on 9/11 can be seen as a failure of deterrence, but the subsequent invasion of Iraq made perfect sense according to this theory. Both attacks did, however, expose greater difficulties for deterring terrorist organizations. In trying to understand possible limitations for deterrence against terrorism three theories come into place: terrorist rationality, terrorist organization and casualty aversion.

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[23] Colby, E. (2007). Restoring deterrence. *Orbis*, *51*(3), 413-428.
[24] Ibid.

Terrorist rationality explains what strategies terrorists use, as the way terrorism is fought is strategically significantly different in comparison to, per example, Russian strategy during the Cold War. Scholars have identified multiple strategies used by terrorists. Thornton came up with five strategical objectives: morale building, advertising, disorientation of the population, elimination of military forces and provocation.[25] The latter is according to Fromkin the most important one for undermining the legitimacy of the more powerful state as for gaining more legitimacy for the terrorist cause.[26] This approach thus uses terrorism to trigger a military response which in turn works in the advantage of the terrorist organization.

A perfect example where this happened is, again, the attack on the twin towers. The Bush administration was aggressive in its foreign policy and was without doubt willing to use force when needed, this same administration also possessed conventional as well as nuclear world leading military capabilities. Those characteristics almost make the ideal deterrent, possessing the willingness and capabilities of using force, but deterrence failed nonetheless. This makes clear that even the most intense counterattack is acceptable for Al-Qaida, as it is beneficial for terrorists when their opponent overreacts. This is exactly what was proved in 2004, as Bin Laden publicly stated that it was "easy for us to provoke this administration".[27] By that time Al-Qaida's support had significantly increased and a decrease of US support occurred simultaneously.[28]

The second aspect necessary to be taken into account when countering terrorism is the organizational structure these kinds of organizations use. According to Kenney organizational structures and counteractions are in the war against terror comparable to the war against drugs.[29] He compares the elimination of drug lords to similar efforts against leaders of organizations like Al-Qaida, and argues that both are useless in the long run.

Trying to harm terrorist organizations by eliminating key figures in the organization will only lead to symbolic victories, as the terrorist organization is based on semi-autonomous cells. If one cell can be eliminated than this will simply

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[25] Thornton, T. P. (1964). Terror as a weapon of political agitation. *Terrorism-Critical Concepts in Political Science, 3*, 41-64.

[26] Fromkin, D. (2006). The strategy of terrorism. *Foreign Affairs, 53*(4).

[27] Lawrence, B. (2005). Messages to the World. *The Statements of Osama bin Laden*.

[28] Kydd, A. H., & Walter, B. F. (2006). The strategies of terrorism. *International Security, 31*(1), 49-80.

[29] Kenney, M. (2003). From Pablo to Osama: Counter-terrorism lessons from the war on drugs. *Survival, 45*(3), 187-206.

be replaced for another network. The only strategy thus working for terrorist organizations as well as drug cartels is countering the supply-side of the problem, a victory can never be achieved without addressing this aspect. Therefore a terrorist organization can never be countered through military attacks only, but causes of terrorism should be addressed with soft power. Through diplomatic, economic and sociological policies.[30]

A third aspect limiting the effectiveness of deterrence is more relevant to military possibilities and tactics, which is the casualty aversion of powerful states combined with tactical problems when fighting non-state actors. This problem is best visible in the Hezbollah case. Hezbollah has been able to stock significant amounts of missiles, something that normally could be easily countered by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). But Hezbollah might be playing a tough strategy to breach. The relations of power between Hezbollah and Israel are comparable to the ones between Iraq and the US.

The IDF has superior nuclear and conventional military capabilities, but Hezbollah has a significant strategical advantage if they succeed to provoke an Israeli attack.[31]

In 2014 Benny Gantz, Chief of staff of the IDF, warned that any attack by Hezbollah would lead to a major attack knocking Lebanon back for 70-80 years.[32] However, this might exactly be what Hezbollah is hoping for. If Hezbollah decides to attack Israel then this will lead to a necessary reaction from Israel. Not only because that is the only possibility to keep deterring Hezbollah in the long run but also because Israel tends to be highly casualty averse. Deaths of Israeli civilians caused by Hezbollah will put serious pressure on the government to react, but Hezbollah has exploited the strategy of deterrence by denial well. Hezbollah is based in populated areas and any attack would thus lead to large amounts of collateral damage, which would significantly harm Israel's reputation internationally. The protection by innocent civilians would also set up the perfect trap for the IDF, undoubtedly leading to major losses in such a scenario.[33]

Casualty aversion cuts both ways, one side is the military aspect and the other one societal. An argument often provided favouring the use of deterrence is the idea

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[30] Ibid.

[31] Harel, A. (2016). Israel's Evolving Military. *Foreign Affairs, 95*(4), 19.

[32] Sobelman, D. (2016) Deterrence Has Kept Hezbollah and Israel At Bay for 10 Years. *The National Interest*.

[33] Harel, A. (2016). Israel's Evolving Military. *Foreign Affairs, 95*(4), 19.

that terrorists don't value their own life but do value their cause.[34] This is, however, a significant problem for an organization like the IDF, having to minimize their casualties in order to keep the fight acceptable. This makes relations of power much more complicated, as an army with superior military capabilities might internally be much weaker. A threat could thus be much more difficult to execute than it appeared to be, and a conflict can be won against relatively powerful enemies by inflicting a relatively small amount of casualties. The second aspect is about winning hearts and minds of potential terrorist recruits. As said, a war against terrorism can't be won solely by military measures as the demand side of terrorism needs to be addressed. However, casualty aversion of the military when entering enemy territory only legitimizes terrorist organizations. Per example, American troops in Afghanistan killed five innocent civilians on the 12th of April 2010 as their bus came too close to the convoy. This reaction is understandable from military tactics, but significantly harms a soft approach in delegitimizing terrorist organization.[35]

Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to explain what deterrence is, when it is successful and whether these successes are still achievable in contemporary society. In answering these questions I have explained the deterrence theory and the various related elements needed to be taken into account when researching the phenomena. An important part is the separation between deterrence theory and strategy, which explains why the results of deterrence vary from case to case.

In my analysis I explained what changes in the world order have occurred and this affected the efficiency of deterrence. There is academically often argued about the applicability of the theory of deterrence in controlling rogue states and non-state actors (most importantly terrorism). This is precisely the distinction I have tried to make, as I argued that rogue states aren't immune to deterrence. I have addressed two main points of critique used in the debate against the effectiveness of deterrence in contemporary society and contradicted both with theoretical claims as well as practical examples. The most important notion here is that rogue states and terrorists are not irrational, and can thus be threatened and deterred. This is,

[34] Colby, E. (2007). Restoring deterrence. *Orbis, 51*(3), 413-428.
[35] The Economist (April 2010). *Casualty aversion leads to casualty displacement*.

however, the main problem when facing terrorist organizations, as terrorists operate strategically significantly different then states do.

In fighting terrorists three main problems occur. The first is that an overreaction from the deterrent can be beneficial for terrorist organizations, as proved by the American invasion of Iraq after 9/11. This is a significant problem for the effectiveness of deterrence. One of the necessary factors for a successful action of deterrence is the costs for the deterred being unacceptable, this is thus a lot more complex to reach when facing terrorists.

The second aspect is the theory of casualty aversion. This can, as explained, influence power relations as well as the credibility of the threat by the deterrent. Per example the IDF will have to take numerous casualties when attacking Hezbollah, which they might not want to get their selves into. Casualty aversion also makes the deterrent too cautious which might lead to deaths of civilians, which leads to further legitimization of the terrorist cause.

My last argument about terrorist organization explains that the deterrent will never be able to defeat the terrorist activity solely through military means. As military successes don't address the demand side of terrorism and therefore only result in symbolic victories. The only way to counter terrorism is through soft power and soft approaches are only harmed by military interventions. Attacking a terrorist organization is thus not only ineffective but also disadvantageous. Therefore deterring a terrorist organization is a bad idea, as the big 'threat' would only empower the organisation.[36]

[36] Kenney, M. (2003). From Pablo to Osama: Counter-terrorism lessons from the war on drugs. *Survival, 45*(3), 187-206.

THE ROLE OF GREECE AND TURKEY'S ACCESSION INTO NATO IN THE STRATEGIC REPOSTURING OF THE UNITED STATES IN EARLY POST-WORLD WAR II EUROPE

Sam Cohen

After outlining Soviet and American strategic posture in Southeastern Europe in the post-WWII environment, the paper identifies that Washington policymakers sought NATO expansion in 1952 to protect the region from embedding with the Soviet realm of influence. The paper then demonstrates how the accession of Greece and Turkey into the NATO alliance in 1952, induced a strategic rebalancing on the European continent through sequential tactical shifts that left the Soviet Union out positioned in Southeastern Europe, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Caucasus by the United States. These tactical gains, and corresponding strategic developments, are then related to and analyzed in a contemporary context focusing on NATO expansionary efforts in Georgia and Ukraine in a period of an assertive Russia.

Introduction

From the perspective of Washington policymakers observing post-World War II Europe, a security priority demanding immediate attention stemmed from Soviet interest in the Eastern Mediterranean region and their expanded influence near the Caucasus. Considering that, by 1946, communism had begun to challenge the political establishment in Greece, the Soviet Union continued to maintain a forward military presence South of the Caucasus, and Moscow remained persistent with territorial assertions along Turkey's Northeastern periphery, U.S. officials concluded that Southeastern Europe was under risk of embedding with the Soviet realm of influence.[1] In response, U.S. policy official's lead by President Truman internalized these Soviet interests as indicators of Moscow's intent to expand strategically, directly resulting in a general U.S. tactical reposturing in Europe in the form

[1] Denise M. Bostdorff, "Harry S. Truman, 'Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine' (March 12, 1947)," *Voices of Democracy* 4 (2008): 1, 5-6.

acceding Greece and Turkey into the NATO alliance in 1952.[2] This paper will highlight how this 1952 expansion represented a key tactical decision by U.S. policymakers that provided Washington with geostrategic superiority on the European continent throughout the early-Cold War period. Further, the paper will explain how this tactical reposturing in Europe proved advantageous to American interests even while the expansion directly resulted in the security vulnerabilities of Eastern Europe being grossly and predictably subjected to Soviet power.

The first portion of the paper will demonstrate that NATO's 1952 expansion was a reactionary policy decision aimed at Soviet interest and policy throughout Southeastern Europe and the Caucasus in addition to the growth of Soviet support for communism throughout the Balkans. This portion will also highlight how the collapse of British financial and military influence in the Eastern Mediterranean after the war created a power vacuum that triggered the mechanisms that would lead to the first NATO expansion.

The second portion of the paper will highlight the tactical gains made by the U.S. with the accession of Greece and Turkey into the NATO alliance, and how these tactical gains reflected a geostrategic rebalancing on the European continent that was extremely advantageous to U.S. interests. Specifically, this portion will emphasize the Soviet Union's loss of guaranteed economic and military maritime access to the Mediterranean Sea through the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits or Greece, and the posturing of Turkey as U.S. ally in the Caucasus.

The third portion of the paper will identify the disadvantages associated with the 1952 accession, noting the movement of Soviet influence westward towards NATO's vulnerable Eastern members as a direct outcome of the accession. This portion will also note that even after this Soviet reposturing, Moscow still failed to compensate for the strategic gains the U.S. acquired with NATO's growth, suggesting the benefits of NATO's 1952 expansion outweighed the costs.

Lastly, the fourth section of the paper will explain how the 1952 expansion yielded strategic advantages to U.S. post-war posture that recent expansionary efforts, notably in Ukraine and Georgia, fail to provide in terms of significance and sustainability. More specifically, this portion will highlight how Ukraine and Georgia's inclusion in NATO offers promising short-term tactical gains for U.S. and

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[2] Zoltan Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 11.

NATO interests, but provides the U.S. with a likely destabilizing strategic posture on the continent that is ultimately not in Washington's interests.

U.S. Tactical Shifts in Europe: a Strategic Rebalancing in 1952

To properly understand the decision to expand NATO in 1952, along with the advantages that it would bring U.S. policymakers attempting to secure American interests in Southeastern Europe, the early-post war geopolitical environment of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus must first be contextualized. By 1947 the British government had communicated to U.S. officials that it would cease all foreign aid commitments to both Greece and Turkey.[3] This decision was rooted in the slow growth of the British economy after the war and the country's inability to maintain foreign expenditures in zones of limited direct importance to British interests.[4] By February of 1947 the British Embassy in Washington had urgently sent diplomatic notes to Secretary of State George Marshal's office requesting the U.S. to assume the responsibility of supporting Greece financially and militarily, considering communist groups had already gained significant public support throughout the country and threatened to gain control of the government.[5]

Senior U.S. policy officials, including Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State appointed by President Truman, argued that the communist presence in Greece in addition to growing Soviet influence on the country easily exerted through proximal Soviet allies' Romania and Bulgaria, threatened to turn Greece into another Soviet satellite power.[6] Acheson stressed an imminently critical situation to President Truman, who would ultimately decide to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining permanent position on the Mediterranean where it was believed Moscow could effectively challenge U.S. strategic posture throughout Southeastern Europe. Although U.S. officials recognized that Turkey did not face the same internal communist threat as Greece, the concern of direct Soviet interference on the country's Eastern border in the Caucasus in addition to disputes with Moscow over

[3] Hans Gutner Brauch, P. H. Liotta, and Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, *Security and Environment in the Mediterranean: Conceptualizing Security and Environmental Conflicts* (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2003), 182.
[4] Ibid., 182-183.
[5] Bostdorff, Harry S. Truman, 7.
[6] Ibid., 5-6, 8.

the Black Sea Straits allowed Truman to construct a strategically ambiguous policy supporting a Greece-Turkey axis against Soviet interests.[7] [8]

President Truman officially introduced this policy in March of 1947 where he addressed a joint session of Congress concerning the Soviet crisis in Greece and Turkey.[9] This address outlined the need for the U.S. to assist Greece and Turkey against antagonistic Soviet behavior, a strategy that would eventually be applied more openly and become known as the Truman Doctrine. It is evident that the introduction of the Truman Doctrine coincided with the growing threat to Turkey and Greece, and that the post-war geopolitical circumstances in each of these countries, which were largely influenced by Soviet interests, provided the backdrop for increased U.S. involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus.[10] This new policy of extended assistance would trigger new strategic relationships and dynamics between the U.S. and the Greco-Turkish axis that would ultimately lead U.S. policymakers to utilize Greece and Turkey as NATO partners as part of Washington's larger strategic posture in Europe to counter Soviet power.

The accession of Greece and Turkey into NATO in 1952 signified three major tactical shifts in Europe and nearby regions – more specifically in Southeastern Europe, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Caucasus. These shifts can be summarized as the advent of U.S. naval and maritime dominance in the Mediterranean Sea, prevention of any direct Soviet or connected allied territorial linkages to Mediterranean waters, and the development of U.S. economic and military influence in the Caucasus. It is important to note that Turkey's geography implicates its strategic relations in multiple regions—Southeastern Europe, the Mediterranean Sea, the Middle East, and the Caucasus—which means any U.S. tactical gain made in association with Turkey in Europe, also has an effect on the other regions. However, Turkey's accession will be shown to reflect a primarily European strategic orientation with U.S. tactical gains in other regions, such as the Caucasus, reflecting secondary interests to Washington policymakers.

In 1946 the Soviet Union proposed joint control over the Black Sea Straits where the Soviet Union and Turkey, and not Turkey alone, would ensure the security

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[7] Kristen Blake, *The U.S.-Soviet Confrontation In Iran 1945-1962: A Case in the Annals of the Cold War* (Lanham: University Press of America Inc., 2009), 28-29.

[8] Bostdorff, Harry S. Truman, 10.

[9] Howard Jones, *A New Kind of War: America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1989), 146.

[10] Ibid., 60-62.

of the waterway.[11] Soviet interest in the Straits stemmed from the economic and security implications a lack of control represented. Moscow understood that the Straits—the Bosporus and the Dardanelles—provided the Soviet Union and their regional allies of Romania and Bulgaria direct access to the maritime trading routes of Europe in the Mediterranean Sea. Further, Moscow envisioned a tactical imbalance in the Mediterranean with U.S. naval forces having guaranteed access to the Sea during notional conflict while Soviet forces would need to traverse a foreign controlled chokepoint.[12] With tensions increasing President Truman ordered the U.S. Navy to deploy a Carrier Task Force to the Straits to demonstrate solidarity with Turkey, who desired unilateral control of the waterway. By 1947, with the arrival of the Truman Doctrine, the U.S. provided a $100 million defence and financial aid package to Turkey, which combined with the naval support, sufficiently enticed Turkish policymakers to accept Western affiliation and firmly prevent the country from entering the Soviet sphere of influence.[13] At the same time funding was being provided to the Turkish government, the U.S. also began delivering economic and security assistance to the Greek government to suppress Soviet supported communist guerilla groups threatening the stability of the country.[14]

By 1947, with Greece and Turkey formally receiving American aid, President Truman decided to permanently station naval forces in the Mediterranean with the formal designation of the U.S. Sixth Task Fleet—officially designated as the U.S. Sixth Fleet in 1950.[15] Additionally, to culminate the positioning of Greece and Turkey as Western allies and reinforce U.S. influence over the Mediterranean Sea, Greece and Turkey were acceded into the NATO alliance in 1952. This expansion represented the beginning of complete U.S. tactical dominance of Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean Sea in the early-post war period. Soviet naval forces operating with the Black Sea Fleet were now effectively useless in any notional regional conflict as the Straits would be closed or rigorously defended to prevent

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[11] Murat Picak, "Political, Economic and Strategic Dimensions of the Turkish-Soviet Straits Question Emerged After World War II," *International Journal of Business and Social Science* 2, no. 15 (2011): 180.
[12] Ibid., 184-185.
[13] Jones, *A New Kind of War*, 60-62.
[14] Ibid.
[15] John B. Hattendorf, *Naval Policy and Strategy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present, and Future* (Abingdon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 147-148.

Soviet operational access to the Mediterranean.[16] Further, with Greece and Turkey both institutionally affiliating with the U.S. sphere of influence, along with control over the Black Sea Straits, the Soviet Union had no option for direct contact with the waters of the Mediterranean through their own territory. This put the Soviet Union, and major security allies of Moscow—Bulgaria and Romania—at risk of loosing guaranteed access to Mediterranean trade routes that were critical for access to Atlantic based trade and Middle Eastern oil travelling through the Suez Canal.[17]

U.S. tactical domination of the economic and security domains of the Mediterranean Sea after the 1952 expansion were evident with onset of NATO naval exercises *Longstep* and *Grand Slam*. During the exercises, both of which Greece and Turkey participated in, over 170 vessels and 700 aircraft engaged in amphibious combat operations off the Western coast of Turkey.[18] The combination of the Soviet disconnect from the Mediterranean Sea, U.S.-Turkish control of the Black Sea Straits, and NATO demonstrating effective naval projection capabilities in the East Mediterranean signaled to policymakers in Moscow that expansion of Soviet influence South and Southwest of Romania and Bulgaria was not possible. On the contrary, these developments signaled to Washington that U.S. Mediterranean interests were secured from Soviet influence and that the current geostrategic posture of Europe left the Soviet Union vulnerable and unmistakably out-positioned by U.S. NATO expansion efforts in Greece and Turkey.[19] [20]

Additionally, with Turkey formally entering the NATO alliance, the U.S. gained a territorial position from which exerting counter-pressure on Soviet influence South into the Middle East could be based. Although major Soviet economic and security interests in the Mediterranean were officially and successfully denied with the 1952 NATO expansion, the ability for Washington to influence tactical dynamics in the Caucasus would prove important to the success of the U.S. reposturing in Europe. U.S. presence, albeit through an ally, in the Caucus region guaranteed that Soviet

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[16] Michel Chossudovsky, "The Strategic Role of the Bosphorus Straits and the Dardanelles linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean," *Global Research Centre,* last modified December 1, 2015, http://www.globalresearch.ca/turkeys-blockade-of-russian-naval-vessels-access-to-the-mediterranean-russias-black-sea-fleet-completely-cut-off/5492688

[17] Picak, Political, Economic and Strategic Dimensions of the Turkish-Soviet Straits Question, 184-185.

[18] "Taking the Big Step Forward: Operation Longstep," *All Hands United States Navy Publication,* June 13, 1949, 10-12.

[19] Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion*, 11.

[20] Jones, *A New Kind of War*, 83-84, 232.

interests would be contained to North of Iran.[21] If Moscow received no tactical opposition to expansion out of the Caucasus Southward into the Middle East, the Soviet Union could reduce aspects of economic and energy insecurity initially established by the Mediterranean disconnect.[22] Therefore, U.S. tactical gains in Europe in the form of acceding Greece and Turkey into NATO, allowed Washington to reduce the Soviet Union's capacity to expand outwards and secure critical interests South of the Caucasus, reinforcing U.S. strategic posture throughout Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean Sea.

By late 1952, U.S. geostrategic posture on the European continent had positioned the Soviet Union at a disadvantage with respect to forward military presence, territorial control, and security of economic interests throughout the region. Although this environment was conducive for Washington and the objective of securing political and economic interests, inevitable Soviet response to the 1952 NATO expansion would ultimately increase Moscow's tactical positioning on the continent.

The reposturing of the U.S. in Europe utilizing the Greco-Turkish axis as members of NATO resulted in limited policy options for Moscow concerning a tactical reaction to Western expansion. Soviet maritime projection into the Mediterranean and Southward movement into the Middle East through the Caucasus were no longer politically or militarily feasible. Policymakers in Moscow were channeled into expanding west towards the NATO alliance to remain tactically competitive on the continent, representing a strategic shift that would culminate with the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955.[23] Although the creation of the Pact stemmed from a multitude of security and economic considerations, the general geostrategic posture it yielded to the Soviet Union in Eastern and Central Europe was predictable due to the previous tactical circumstances created by the contentious 1952 NATO expansion.[24] Further, considering the economic and military capacities of the Western European NATO members in the early 1950's were inadequate for competing in a tactical standoff with the Soviet Union and its allies, the decision to accede Greece and Turkey into the alliance can be criticized as

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[21] Nathalie Tocci, *Turkey's European Future: Behind the Scenes of America's Influence on EU-Turkey Relations* (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 26-26.
[22] Jones, *A New Kind of War*, 57-58.
[23] Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005), 59-60, 504.
[24] Ibid.

a major strategic mishap as the only plausible destination of Soviet response would have been directed at this still weak portion of NATO. However, with the prevention of a direct Soviet linkage to the Mediterranean Sea, the U.S. guaranteed that Soviet naval forces could not be easily deployed across maritime commons deep into Southwestern Europe – a trade off U.S. policy officials viewed as advantageous to the security of Europe.[25] Additionally, Moscow's tactical repositioning toward Western Europe would ultimately fail to compensate for the economic insecurity and lost trade opportunity uncertain Mediterranean access through the Black Sea Straits provided.[26] Although Soviet expansion West into Europe provided a major political and security threat to the NATO bloc that was heavily influenced with the geostrategic alignment of Turkey and Greece into the alliance, U.S. posture on the continent remained superior due to the damaging security and economic conditions induced on the Soviet Union by the initial NATO expansion.

Contemporary Analysis: Georgia-Ukraine Case Study

To evaluate the prospect of Ukrainian and Georgian accession into the NATO alliance, it is first important to note that unlike the advantageous strategic realignment of U.S. posture the accession of Greece and Turkey represented, a current NATO expansion inclusive to Ukraine and Georgia would only provide limited and strictly tactical gains for the U.S. and NATO powers.[27] Beyond increasing the presence of forward deployed security forces on the periphery of Russia's Western and Southern borders, the alliance would also gain influence over natural gas networks and pipelines entering Europe from the East and the upper Caucus region.[28] These new or increased methods of influence on a Russia already surrounded by NATO members would only decrease the strategic fluidity of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, resulting in a rigidity that would leave little geopolitical space for deconfliction processes. With no significant political spaces for tensions to dissipate or for tactical actions and reactions to evolve, a strategic rebalancing of either Eastern Europe or the Caucasus in response to NATO enlargement would

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[25] Mahmoud Mohamed Talha, Brigadier General, Egyptian Army, "The Strategic Importance of the Mediterranean" (Individual Study Project, U.S. Army War College Foreign Military Studies Program, 1990), 12-14.

[26] Ibid., 8-10, 15

[27] Charles Krupnick, *Almost NATO: Partners and Players In Central and Eastern European Security* (Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 225, 227-228.

[28] Nataliya Esakova, *European Energy Security: Analyzing the EU-Russia Energy Security Regime in Terms of Interdependence Theory* (Frankfurt: Springer VS, 2012), 240-242.

likely result in conflict or contentious fallout.[29] Considering the accession of Turkey and Greece took place in a period where Central and Eastern Europe were still free of strategic alignment, the calculation to expand NATO in 1952 was both tactically and strategically beneficial and sustainable as Moscow had a space to respond to expanded U.S. influence. However, the same does not hold true for NATO expansion inclusive to Ukraine and Georgia, where limited tactical gains to the alliance's forward presence near Russia fail to compensate for the instability that would ensue with Russia and the U.S.-NATO axis having no fluidity in their strategic relations.

Ultimately, current geopolitical and security circumstances in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus indicate that Ukraine-Georgia NATO expansion represents a relatively minor tactical advantage for the U.S. and NATO. Further, the accession of either country into the alliance has been noted by security officials in the U.S. as a development that would likely decrease the strategic stability on the continent and directly contribute to structural and political setbacks to U.S. geostrategic posture in each region.[30] Compared to the significant tactical benefits associated with NATO expansion in 1952, and the reinforcement of U.S. strategic interests the expansion represented, it is accurate to suggest that neither Ukraine nor Georgia's accession into NATO would meet the tactical or strategic imperative that justified the inclusion of Greece and Turkey. This conclusion, concerning the predictable strategic instability inclusion would cause and the limited tactical benefits it would yield compared to the significant gains seen in the 1952 expansion, underwrites the argument that Washington should commit to denying NATO expansionary efforts in both Ukraine and Georgia.

Conclusion

The introduction of Greece and Turkey into the NATO security alliance constituted a major transition in America's geostrategic posture in Europe in 1952. Major tactical gains made by the U.S., rooted in economic and security maritime dominance in the Mediterranean Sea and improved positioning in the Caucus region, created conditions on the European continent that left the Soviet Union strategically outmaneuvered by Washington policymakers. Although the expansion channeled Moscow's own geostrategic reposturing West towards economically and militarily

[29] John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault," *Foreign Affairs,* last modified October 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault

[30] Ibid.

weak Eastern NATO members, the tactical gains the expansion provided for U.S. interests outweighed the consequences of the Soviet Union's realignment of Eastern Europe as a security bloc alliance. This paper highlighted that the protection of critical economic and military interests the 1952 expansion provided for the U.S. throughout the Mediterranean and Caucus regions were major strategic advantages that justified and demanded the accession of Greece and Turkey. Further, by highlighting the inability to equate the strategic significance of acceding Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance to the advantages the Greco-Turkish accession provided, the paper ultimately advocated for Washington to deny NATO expansionary efforts in Georgia and Ukraine to prevent the likely fallout of dangerous strategic rigidity between the U.S. and Russia.

WHAT ARE THE LINKS BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND TERRORISM?

Charles Fidler

This paper defines terrorism as "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence, or the threat of violence, in the pursuit of political change". For the purpose of this paper, democracy is not linear, but includes characteristics such as "elections, rule of law, separation of powers, pluralism, and various civic and political freedoms". This paper seeks to address these links by unwrapping some of the important research that has been conducted in relation to democracy and terrorism. This research concludes that stable democracies see less violence than autocracies, but transitioning democracies or those democracies pursuing aggressive foreign policies will see more terrorism. Terrorism is a violent political action that is dependent both on the actual institutional structures of states as well as the societal grievances that accompany an environment where terrorism is a viable political option.

Introduction

The relationships between governments and societies that live inside and outside the territorial boundaries of the state have led to speculation about the connection between the state and violent non-state actors. While terrorism affected democratic states largely before the events of 2001, the attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda against the West in the 21st century has led to an increasing interest in understanding the links between democratic regimes and terrorism. While it is not within the essay's scope to discuss the intricacies of definitional arguments, consensus between different actors on the definition of democracy and terrorism has been sporadic.[1] The multitude of aspects that are implicit to any definition of these terms has led those who study such intricacies to agree only on potential characteristics without an empirically agreed definition. Without an explicit definition of these two terms, academics and policymakers are sure to have conflicting research, analysis, and predication on any notion of democracy and terrorism. This paper defines terrorism as "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence, or the threat of

[1] Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside terrorism*. 3rd ed., Columbia University Press, 2006. 20-34.

violence, in the pursuit of political change".[2] For the purpose of this paper, democracy is not linear, but includes characteristics such as "elections, rule of law, separation of powers, pluralism, and various civic and political freedoms".[3] This paper seeks to address these links by unwrapping some of the important research that has been conducted in relation to democracy and terrorism. This research concludes that stable democracies see less violence than autocracies, but transitioning democracies or those democracies pursuing aggressive foreign policies will see more terrorism. Terrorism is a violent political action that is dependent both on the actual institutional structures of states as well as the societal grievances that accompany an environment where terrorism is a viable political option.

Current Data Trends:

A large amount of literature on terrorism challenges the assumption that democratic regimes are generally less likely to experience terrorism by provide peaceful outlets for disagreement between societal members within the state.[4] A study conducted by Eubank and Leonard largely rejects this assumption and concludes that terrorist groups are much more likely to operate in democratic states rather than states with autocratic regimes. It is argued that this is due to civic and political liberties that constrain liberal democracies.[5] Methodological concerns have been brought up regarding the Eubank and Weinberg study, specifically concerning usage of group-specific data and not incidence data. Furthermore, oppressive regimes may publicize terror attacks less, which would indefinitely skew data.[6] Eyerman, using data sets from International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), found slightly conflicting data. While democracies had fewer years of no terrorism, Eyerman found that democratic regimes experienced more terrorist events during certain period, with transitory democracies experiencing more terrorist attacks and established democracies receiving less.[7] Li, also using the ITERATE database, claimed the links between democracies and transnational terrorism are much more

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[2] Ibid. 40.

[3] Tilly, Charles. *Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, 2007. 1-24.

[4] Ganor, Boaz. Global alert: the rationality of modern Islamist terrorism and the challenge to the liberal democratic world. Columbia University Press, 2015. 78-79.

[5] Eubank, William Lee, and Leonard Weinberg. "Does democracy encourage terrorism?" *Terrorism and Political Vio lence*, vol. 6, no. 4, 1994. 429.

[6] Sandler, Todd. "On the relationship between democracy and terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 7, no. 4, 1995. 1–7.

[7] Eyerman, Joe.." *International Interactions*, vol. 24, no. 2, 1998. 156–160.

complicated than previously asserted by other literature. While democratic participation reduces transnational terrorism, "institutional constraints" of democracies are positively correlated with terrorism. Furthermore, Li's findings suggest that democratic regimes that used proportional representation were less likely to see terrorist incidents in their country while mixed and majoritarian systems were likely to see more than undemocratic regimes.[8] Li's findings are furthered by Chenoweth who, using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and using Goldstone's regime classification types, found that partial democracies with factionalism had the highest number of terror attacks from 1983 to 1998 and 2007-2010, and in 2000 to 2010 countries that were under foreign occupation also saw increase in terrorist related events.[9] Figure 1 shows important data regarding the links between democracy and terrorism.

Figure 1

Authors	Research Data Set	Findings	Data Problems
Eubank and Weinberg (1994) Sandler (1995) [Data Problems]	*World Directory of Terrorist and Other Organizations Associated with Guerrilla Warfare, Political Violence and Protest *Democracy: A Worldwide Survey	*(+) Democracies *(+) Civil and political rights *(+) Number of political parties *(+) Party dispersion is correlated with terrorist groups *(+) Economic discrimination *(+) Social mobilization	*Underreporting terrorist activities in authoritarian regimes *Group driven data *Hard to replicate *Definitional issues *Change in base of operation. *Data that was captured at different points in time. *Different variables affecting other variables.
Eyerman (1998)	ITERATE (1968-1977 and 1978-1986)	*(-) Established Democracies *(+) New/Transitioning Democracies *(+/-) Non-Democracies (See less than new, but more than established) *(-) Extraction Compacity *(+) GDP *(+) Population	*Focus on Transnational Data *Event specific data. *Reporting bias *Structure of Data: Spill overs data eliminated. *Definitional issues
Li (2005)	ITERATE (1975-1997)	*(-) Greater democratic participation. *(+) Intuitional constrains *(-) Economic Development *(+) Regime Change *(+) Capable Governments *(+) History of Terrorist Violence * Civil and Political Limitations does not reduce terrorist violence.	*Focuses on transnational data. *Definitional issues *Voter turnout higher in repressive regimes. *Voting habits in different regimes. *Reporting Bias
Walsh and Piazza (2010)	*ITERATE (1981-2003) *RAND-MIPT (1998-2004)	*(-) Physical Integrity Rights [T/D] *(+) Durability [T/D] *(NA) Participation *(NA) Executive Constrain *(+) Civil War [T/D] *(+) Population [D] *(+) GDP per capita [T]	*Uses open source data *Definitional issues *Reporting bias

Figure 1 shows the basic research data sets, findings, and potential data problems of four authors included in the sources. Findings: (+) shows positive correlation to terrorism; (-) negative correlation to terrorism; (NA) not significant. [D] stands for Domestic Terrorism and [T] stands for Transnational Terrorism.

[8] Li, Quan. "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 49, no. 2, 2005. 287-291.

[9] Chenoweth, Erica. "Terrorism and Democracy." *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 16, no. 1, Nov. 2013. 358-359.

Why Might Democracies See More Terrorism

A structural augment claims that democratic regimes with extensive civil liberties are more prone to terrorism because they lower the associated cost of operation for a terrorist group. Schmidt in his article *Terrorism and Democracy* characterizes democracy as a system that is "ruled by the majority while respecting the right of the minority," while terrorism "is an instrument of rule of a tyrannic minority whether in or out of power." Through this contradiction, Schmidt claims that democracies are at a "tactical disadvantage" against violent groups such as terrorists because terrorism possess an "acceptability and effectiveness" in which the government has to choose between effective counter-terrorist policies or preserving "civil" or "political liberties."[10] According to the Rational Choice Theory, when the costs and risks that terror organizations use to operate are low, terrorism will be more likely to occur.[11] In a liberal democracy, freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom of the press, the number of targets, legal constraints, and negative externalities that are associated with the rise of economic liberalism have become critical components of democratic societies that lower the cost for terrorists to operate. Institutional constraints prohibit the state from implementing draconian counter-terrorism strategies that might be otherwise implemented in undemocratic regimes without the total loss of regime legitimacy by the polity.[12] Pape claims that democracies are more vulnerable to terrorism because the polity within a democratic country is more sensitive to violence and is easily manipulated by violent organizations, especially when considering suicide terrorism tactics.[13] While not specifically mentioned in Pape, democratic "sensitivities" could come from the media exposure that is granted to terrorist organizations. Since terrorist organizations essentially want to "maximize publicity" in order to intimidate or coerce its target audience, liberal democracies with extensive press freedom could be beneficial to terrorist groups. For example, the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 by Hezbollah in 1985 and the finding that almost 80 percent of Americans who planned

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[10] Schmid, Alex P. "Terrorism and democracy." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 4, no. 4, 1992. 14–15.
[11] Crenshaw, Martha. "The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 13, no. 4, 1981. 385.
[12] Chenoweth, Erica. "Terrorism and Democracy." *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 16, no. 1, Nov. 2013. 361.
[13] Pape, Robert A. "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, no. 3, Nov. 2003. 344.

to travel abroad found overseas travel too dangerous after the hijacking supports Pape's theory.[14]

Unfortunately, Reiter and Wade found that there was almost no difference between regime types and suicide terrorism when they aggregated more data and used a more methodical analysis, largely putting Pape's hypothesis in doubt.[15] Likewise, if Pape's argument was sustainable we might see terrorists generally being more successful. Further research has concluded that only three out of 42 terrorist groups were "successful," a seven percent success rate. This is primarily because terrorism "miscommunicates" political goals and gives the impression that terrorists want to destroy "societies" and "publics," thereby eroding the prospect of the target state making concessions.[16] Concurrently, domestic terrorist groups may find the media counterproductive to their cause. While potentially trying to lure the democratic regime into repressive actions that would delegitimize the state, in stable democracies where political institutions are perceived as legitimate, actors such as terrorists that operate outside the means of normal political communication may lose support, become deprived of manpower and resources, and cease to exist.[17] However, in democratic institutions that are not perceived as legitimate, terrorist or violent non-state actors could find ample maneuverability and sympathy within at least a minority of the population.[18] Using McCarthy and Zald's resource mobilization approach, it is possible to stipulate that democracies allow for easier social mobilization and resource accumulation through liberal democratic values that could potentially create groups that resort to terrorism.[19] Furthermore, democratic social mobilization could allow the population to sympathize and legitimize terrorist groups. For example, Hezbollah, a Lebanese terrorist organization, has continued to participate in Lebanese democratic political processes since 1992 despite advocating for a "radical Shi'ite Islamic caliphate dominated by

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[14] Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside terrorism*. 3rd ed., Columbia University Press, 2006. 190.

[15] Wade, Sara Jackson, and Dan Reiter. "Does Democracy Matter?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 51, no. 2, 2007. 345.

[16] Abrahms, Max. "Why Terrorism Does Not Work." *International Security*, vol. 31, no. 2, 2006. 51-56.

[17] Crenshaw, Martha. "How terrorism declines." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1991, pp. 80; Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups." *International Security*, vol. 31, no. 1, 2006. 2-3.

[18] Huntington, Samuel. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New ed., Yale University Press, 2006. 1-5.

[19] McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 82, no. 6, May 1977. 1214-1217.

Islamic law." During this time, its political weight in the Lebanese government has grown without the organizing disavowing terrorism actions.[20]

If terrorist groups are trying to amplify their voices using media to be on a "level playing field" with the state, then it might be possible that terrorist incidents happen in countries where social mobilization and protests frequently occur. Baker et al. found a positive significance between nonviolent protests and terrorist events and retorted that protests exacerbate the perceived weakness of the state and condition protest actors to "outbid" others to gain support, possibly leading to violence. Concurrently, the authors found that state coercion increases the perception of a strong state and reduced terrorism.[21] The strength of this argument potentially shows why some countries such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are attacked more often than countries with less social mobilization such as the Nordic countries and Japan.[22] Furthermore, it could be argued that transitioning democracies accrue more violence because "social mobilization" and "political consciousness" are increasing faster than "effective" and "legitimate" political institutions, creating "political decay" and terrorism.[23] Critics of this argument claim that it "overpredicts" terrorism because both democratic and autocratic countries with social mobilization do not always see terrorism. Further research is needed to see how social and political mobilization increases or decreases the likelihood of terrorism in societies.[24]

Challenges to the Positive Link Between Democracy and Terrorism

The rational model has been used to challenge the theory that democracies will see more terrorism. Using what Eyerman calls the "political access school" of thought, democracies are less likely to see terrorism because the cost of turning to terrorism in a democratic state is higher than the benefits.[25] Democracies generally have "conflict-reducing mechanisms" built into their internal institutions that, if working properly, allow for a degree of legitimacy by the general population Furthermore, any

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[20] Ganor, Boaz. Global alert: the rationality of modern Islamist terrorism and the challenge to the liberal democratic world. Columbia University Press, 2015. 74-78.

[21] Baker, Ryan, et al. "How Much Terror? Dissidents, Governments, Institutions and the Cross-National Study of Terror Attacks." *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 53, 2016. 713-722.

[22] Chenoweth, Erica. "Terrorism and Democracy." *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 16, no. 1, Nov. 2013. 357.

[23] Huntington, Samuel. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New ed., Yale University Press, 2006. 5.

[24] Chenoweth, Erica. "Terrorism and Democracy." *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 16, no. 1, Nov. 2013. 368.

[25] Eyerman, Joe.." International Interactions, vol. 24, no. 2, 1998. 152.

violent action may accrue backlash on the terrorist organization, even if a segment of the population sympathizes with the terrorist cause due to the unconventional nature of the violent political action.[26]

It is possible that both approaches are correct in their own right: democracies may not be the target of terrorism necessarily because of the liberal democratic principles, but their liberal principles could inhibit counter-terrorism policies when terrorism already exists, during democratic transitional periods, or when democratic regimes pursue aggressive foreign policies.[27] Walsh and Piazza, using ITERATE and the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (RAND-MIRP), found that a democratic institution's respect for "physical integrity rights" and human rights are negatively correlated with terrorism. Their work, despite using open source materials which are potentially susceptible to flaws, may be more valid due to their using both transnational and domestic terrorist incidents.[28] Unlike transnational terrorist groups, domestic terrorist groups may be more influenced to strike the government when physical rights are limited. This could be why Li, using transnational data, found that the links between transnational terrorism and human rights were "spurious" while Walsh and Piazza, using both domestic and transnational data, found a negative correlation.[29] Kurrild-Klitgaard, et al. delve deeper into this topic and found that transnational terrorism within the origin country of a democracy is strongly negative, while also finding that political freedom in a country is non-linear. The authors suggest that violence in democracies, particularly in the West, have little to do with respect to civil or human rights, but potentially on political freedoms. They also conclude that transitioning democracies and "half-democracies" may create perceived political grievances that are uncontrollable by the new regime.[30]

Government policies are crucial to understanding the links between democracy and terrorism. Research done by Koch and Cranmer found that left wing governments saw more incidences of terrorism than did right wing governments.

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[26] Schmid, Alex P. "Terrorism and democracy." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 4, no. 4, 1992. 17.

[27] Eyerman, Joe.." International Interactions, vol. 24, no. 2, 1998. 165; Blomberg, S. Brock, and B. Peter Rosendorff. "A Gravity Model of Globalization, Democracy and Transnational Terrorism." *SSRN Electronic Journal*, Nov. 2006. 15.

[28] Walsh, James I., and James A. Piazza. "Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 43, no. 5, 2010. 571.

[29] Ibid. 554-571.

[30] Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, et al. "The political economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism." *Public Choice*, vol. 128, no. 1-2, 2006. 307-309.

Because left wing governments are attributed to "dove-like" domestic welfare policies and right-wing parties are associated with "hawkish" internationalist policies, terrorist organizations believe that left wing governments will be weaker in their response to terrorism, possibly giving validity to the civic liberty argument above that democracies see more terrorism.[31] Denzell rejects this claim and concludes that right wing parties tend to restrict access to the government, inhibit freedom, and push "working-class groups" from power. Finding that institutions are precluding them from political power, left-wing actors will make a cost-benefit analysis and decide whether terrorism is worth the cost. Similarly, other authors have found that more inclusive political structures, such as regimes that employ proportional representation and a high degree of judicial independence, see less terrorist violence than those democracies that are more exclusive, such as a majoritarian electoral system.[32] Unfortunately, Aksoy, one of the leading proponents of this theory, only uses countries in Western Europe to support her thesis[33] and research done by Foster et al. that studied a much larger data range from GTD found that more "inclusive institutions" increase "fractionalization and gridlock" in the electorate. With decreased "political clout," small minority parties have little power and revert to terrorism.[34]

However, Suvan and Phillips conclude in their research that the political structure of a democratic state has less to do with terrorism and more to do with their "foreign policy behavior." They suggest that democracies are largely the target of transnational terrorist organizations and find the correlation between regime type and domestic terrorism is not statistically significant.[35] Potentially consistent with Suvan and Phillips, Blomberg and Rosendorff found a negative relationship between terrorist incidences in transnational source country terrorism and a positive correlation between transnational host country terrorism when the host country

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[31] Koch, Michael T, and Skyler Cranmer. "Testing the "Dick Cheney" Hypothesis: Do Governments of the Left Attract More Terrorism than Governments of the Right?" *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, vol. 24, 2007. 323.

[32] Aksoy, Deniz. "Elections and the Timing of Terrorist Attacks." *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 76, no. 4, 2012.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Foster, Dennis M., et al. "There Can Be No Compromise: Institutional Inclusiveness, Fractionalization and Domestic Terrorism." *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 43, 10 Oct. 2012. 555.

[35] Savun, Burcu, and Brian Phillips. "Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 53, no. 6, Dec. 2009. 896.

pursues aggressive foreign policies.[36] This may explain why the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom have more incidents of terrorism while other democracies experience very little.

Conclusion

What is and what is not a democracy or a terrorist group has led to difficulty in establishing linkages between them. Furthermore, difficulties in finding data and large differences in methodological techniques lead to significantly different outcomes when analyzing data from notoriously covert groups. Despite the general consensus that transitioning democracies see more terrorist incidents within their country, it should be a priority for researchers and policymakers to continue studying multiple disciplines in order to properly codify distinct linkages from data. Furthermore, finding these linkages is especially important for policy makers to effectively create legitimate and conscientious counterterrorism strategies. Continued data that is lackadaisical in understanding the differences between transnational and domestic terrorism will continue to lead democratic policies astray. It could be argued that transitioning democracies and regimes that saw terrorism before they were democracies experience more terrorist incidences than non-democracies. Additionally, established democracies that have aggressive foreign policies may also experience more terrorism. When these terrorist groups are already within the democratic country or regimes act as host countries for terrorism, democracies may be institutionally constrained in destroying the targeted terrorist groups, especially if those groups are dispersed in diaspora communities.[37] Further research needs to be done on diaspora communities, their ties to terrorism source countries, and the tactical and strategic differences that arise between domestic and transnational terrorism and how this effects counterterrorism policies.

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[36] Blomberg, S. Brock, and B. Peter Rosendorff. "A Gravity Model of Globalization, Democracy and Transnational Terrorism." *SSRN Electronic Journal*, Nov. 2006. 21-22.

[37] Hoffman, Bruce, et al. "The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism." *RAND National Security Research Division*, 2007. vii-xi.

IN WHAT WAYS, IF ANY, IS THE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF WORLD POLITICS BETTER THAN OTHER APPROACHES?

Emily Ralston

What history and sociology have to offer the "science" of international relations is contested in the realm of IR theory. This essay claims the necessity of both history and sociology in order to critically interpret structure/agency and define sovereignty in international relations. Furthermore, the innate complexities of studying international relations requires a reflexive framework of theory, i.e. a historical sociological approach, in order to combat reductionist explanations of world politics.

Introduction

From world wars to globalization, how the international relates with itself is intrinsically complicated and even more complex to study. Within the study of IR[1] there are an array of approaches to understanding world politics, the sociological approach being one such approach. What can the sociological approach offer theorists of international relations? In what ways is it better than other approaches? This essay will first connect the study of sociology to that of IR before addressing the previously posed questions by delving into two facets of the sociological approach: (i) sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's fusion of structuralism/ constructivism and (ii) historical sociology. More mainstream approaches to IR theory (neorealism, classical realism, constructivism, and the English School) will be discussed throughout and used to highlight where the sociological approach can offer insight. Ultimately, it will be determined that the sociological approach is better than other approaches at interpreting structure/agency, defining sovereignty in IR, and combating reductionist explanations of world politics.

Sociology as an area of study has similar roots to that of IR. "Sociology plays a role in the social sciences as the discipline associated with the study of the particular

[1] Abbreviation for "international relations" that will be used interchangeably with "international relations" throughout this essay.

form and content of modern society, seen as emerging from the "'dual revolutions" that took place in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century".[2] Much like how IR sprung from the ashes of World War I and II, sociology was formed out of the necessity of understanding social relationships in a world that was rapidly industrializing (e.g. England) and experiencing political shifts (e.g. revolution(s) in France) like never before. As these two areas of study share a similar genesis, "it could be argued that there is relatively little in the discipline – at least in terms of IR theory – that stands outside from the influence of sociological approaches, theories and concepts".[3] Kenneth Waltz (father of neorealism), for example, borrowed from Émile Durkheim in generating "his conceptualisation of international anarchy partly by differentiating between domestic and international orders by reference to Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity".[4] Sociology undertones have thus been present in IR theory from its inception.

Pierre Bourdieu's Different Perspectives

The sociological approach to international relations has recently moved from the background of IR theory to the foreground, bringing fresh voices to internal debates surrounding our understanding of world politics. The work of Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist, is one such voice that has been applied by IR scholars to the ongoing structure-agency debate. Constructivist Alexander Wendt explains this issue as having "origins in two truisms about social life which underlie most social scientific inquiry:

1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and 2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors. Taken together these truisms suggest that human agents and social structures are, in one way or another, theoretically interdependent or a mutually implicating entity".[5]

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[2] Nisbet, Robert. The Sociological Tradition. London: Heinemann, 1967; Elias, Norbert. *What is Sociology?* London: Hutchinson, 1978.

[3] Lawson, George and Shilliam, Robbie. Sociology and international relations: legacies and prospects. *Cambridge review of international affairs* , 23 (1) (2010). 69-86.

[4] Ibid. 5.

[5] Wendt, Alexander E. (Summer, 1987) The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations. *International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3* (Summer, 1987).

To this debate, Bourdieu offers the "theoretical device of habitus and field".[6] "Habitus" is neither structure nor agency, rather it "conveys this mutually constitutive dialectic that unites agents and structures[7]".[8] In the context of habitus, structures are "social, not natural, phenomena and are conceived as the product of collective history".[9] Habitus is then the culmination of experience and structure that lends humans an innate sense of what to do in varying situations; it is the "materialization of collective memory".[10] Habitus is not fixed. In conjunction with habitus is "field." The "field is a social space structured along three principal dimensions: power relations, objects of struggle, and the rules taken for granted within the field".[11] Fields are the "specific contexts in which practice takes place; they give meaning to agency".[12] One's habitus is thus oriented, in part, by the field one occupies.

What does field and habitus have to offer to the canon of IR theory? By using Bourdieu's theoretical tools, social actions become the result of an encounter between field and habitus.[13] In order to understand agency interests, one must study the field in which agents are operating.[14] With this in mind, the logic of practice doesn't have to sit within structure or agency, rather "at the midpoint" of the two which then "resolves the tension brought to light by Wendt in IR".[15] Realists dispute that it is possible to solve the ontological dilemma of structure/agency with

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[6] Pouliot, Vincent & Merand, Frederic. "Bourdieu's Concepts, Political sociology in international relations." In *Bourdieu in International Relations, Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*, edited by Rebecca Adler-Nissen, 26. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013.

[7] "This is the point where Bourdieu is at his most conceptually innovative, developing one of the fundamental analytical tools of a relational ontology" (Pouliot & Merand 2013, 29).

[8] Ibid. 29

[9] Guzzini, Stefano. "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations." European Journal of International Relations Vol 6, Issue 2 (June 2, 2000). 164.

[10] Ibid. 166.

[11] Bourdieu, Pierre. The Field of cultural production: essays on art and literature . Cambridge: Columbia University Press, 1993. 72-77.

[12] Guzzini, Stefano. "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations." European Journal of International Relations Vol 6, Issue 2 (June 2, 2000). 165-166.

[13] Pouliot, Vincent & Merand, Frederic. "Bourdieu's Concepts, Political sociology in international relations." In *Bourdieu in International Relations, Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*, edited by Rebecca Adler-Nissen, 30. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013.

[14] Guzzini, Stefano. "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations." European Journal of International Relations Vol 6, Issue 2 (June 2, 2000).

[15] Pouliot, Vincent & Merand, Frederic. "Bourdieu's Concepts, Political sociology in international relations." In *Bourdieu in International Relations, Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*, edited by Rebecca Adler-Nissen, 30. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013.

Bourdieu's relational ontology.[16] To this, Bourdieu-ians reply that prioritizing ontology over epistemology is now passé[17] and ontology/epistemology are more two sides of the same coin[18].[19] Per Guzzini, we construct logic (i.e. scientific knowledge) just as we construct social reality.

Bourdieu seizes this construction and "underlines the ontological continuity between words and the things they are meant to signify".[20]

The idea of sovereignty is integral to the study of IR. Essentially, "sovereignty is the very concept that makes IR theory a separate body of knowledge possible".[21] How to understand sovereignty on the international stage has animated many debates between theorists of different IR traditions. Morgenthau (of classical realism) defines sovereignty as being indivisible authority to create and enforce laws within a territory.[22] R.B.J. Walker illustrates his idea of state sovereignty with the concept of "inside/outside". For Walker, internally the sovereign state is enforcing its ideals (i.e. its politics) and externally there is chaos (e.g. war) that the state will have to engage with at some point. The English School views state sovereignty as being a prerequisite to maintaining international order. Hedley Bull illustrates this sentiment by warning us "against destroying this order by promoting post-sovereign utopias".[23]

Not heeding the advice of Bull, issues have been raised against the classical understanding of sovereignty. Some say that we must question if the "sovereign state" is still relevant. For example, states are entering into agreements, such as the E.U., that "pool aspects of their sovereign power"[24] which breaks up Morgenthau's idea of "indivisible authority" within their respective territories and challenges how necessary state sovereignty is to maintaining world order. Another disruptive factor to sovereignty comes from globalization; the state's power over the flow of people

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[16] Ibid.30

[17] The ontology > epistemology debate was upheld by certain constructivists (e.g. Wendt, Dessler, Adler).

[18] See "The Social Construction of Reality" by Berger and Luckmann.

[19] Ibid. 30.

[20] Ibid.30

[21] Cox, Robert W. Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. *Millennium* Vol 10, Issue 2, (June 1, 1981). 126 - 155

[22] Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among nations; the struggle for power and peace . New York: Knopf, 1956.

[23] Ibid. 181.

[24] Sasses, S. Losing Control? Sovereignty om am Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. xv.

and capital has increasingly dwindled. An apt critique of the sovereign state comes from the constructivists' corner who say that "sovereignty" and the "state" are social constructs in a certain time and space.[25] This then begs the question, if citizens cease to recognize states' legitimacy, what sort of world order would spring up in its stead?

Bourdieu offers an alternative view to sovereignty by examining the notion of "state." He views the state as a "central bank for symbolic credit".[26] Thus what happens within a state is justified by the symbolic credit previously accumulated. The state is "special because it does not compete for the definition of, for example, legal and educational status because it already has preeminence over these areas; it has meta-capital".[27] This meta-capital propels the state to be present across all fields. The state is thus not a "unitary actor"[28] which is counter to the notion that there is an "outside view".[29] The state does not operate outside of its population but rather is "divided among and within its various agencies and elected bodies".[30] Therefore the state is not "outside" of its citizens, as much as it is "of" its citizens.[31] We have now stripped the convoluted exterior of sovereignty and put it squarely in the hands of people. For Bourdieu, this meant that everyday actions by citizens are just as important as actions of states (and/or representatives of states). It is citizens' contributions to society that form the framework of the state; without this framework the state would dissipate. From this perspective, theorists must take a hard look at social practices to make sense of sovereignty and, more broadly, the dynamics of world politics.[32]

IR itself lacks any sort of "recipe" to understanding the world's dynamics, therefore there is definite value in looking for answers (or in some cases, questions)

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[25] Kratochwil, Friedrich. Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989; Ruggie, John Gerard. "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations." *International Organization* , Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter, 1993). 139-174.

[26] Bourdieu, Pierre, La Noblesse d'Etat: Grandes écoles et esprit de corps . Paris: Minuit, 1998.

[27] Chopra, Rohit."Neoliberalism as doxa: Bourdieu's theory of the state and the contemporary Indian discourse on globalization and liberalization." *Cultural Studies,* 3⁄4 (17) (2003). 419-444.

[28] Nissen 2013, 184)

[29] Ibid. 183.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Chopra, Rohit."Neoliberalism as doxa: Bourdieu's theory of the state and the contemporary Indian discourse on globalization and liberalization." *Cultural Studies,* 3⁄4 (17) (2003). 430.

[32] Nissen 2013, 184)

outside of the constraints of mainstream IR theory. By gaining different perspectives, social scientists are emboldened with a richer understanding of the layers surrounding classic theories such as sovereignty (as discussed). More so, sociologists such as Bourdieu force the social back into "social science." In reading Bourdieu's work, I was struck by his merging of constructs that I've accepted with forces I'm unaware of that ultimately funnel one into decisions one is blind to making. Utilizing Bourdieu's tools on the international level allows for students of IR to have a better grasp on the questions one must address when analyzing the most frustrating aspect of world politics: human nature.

Historical Sociology

We are long past the stagnant Cold War Era of IR theory. With the emergence of political diversity and global connectivity, IR theory has new questions to answer that cannot be satiated with bipolar responses. Historical sociology is a specific discipline within the sociological approach that has emerged with the ambition of providing a deeper understanding of current world politics through the lense of history. For historical sociologists, "the study of IR is not best served through the pursuit of monocausal explanations. Mainstream IR theory has become reductionist in the sense of relying on one element of explanation alone".[33]

To illustrate how history is the prescription for the monocausal tumor of IR theory, I will utilize historical sociologist John M. Hobson's application of historical sociology to "chronofetishism and tempocentrism".[34] Chronofetishism[35] refers to the idea that the present is an adequate explanation for the present; that there is no need to reference history when dealing with modernity's problems. The predominant issue I see with chronofetishism is that it creates the idea that social structures simply are, with no links to the past. For example, with chronofetishism, we would study terrorist networks in Somalia and view them as "effectively naturalised on the basis that it (they) emerged spontaneously in accoradnce with

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[33] Hobden, Stephen. "Historical sociology: back to the future of international relations?" In *Historical Sociology of International Relations,* edited by Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson, 42-59. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 43.

[34] Hobson, John M. "What's as state in 'bringing historical sociology back into international relations'? Transcending 'chronofetishism' and tempocentrism' in international relations." In *Historical Sociology of International Relations,* edited by Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson, 3-41. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.

[35] "Much, though clearly not all, of contemporary IR is "historophobic," in that it views historical analysis as exogenous to the subject matter of the discipline" (Hobson 2002, 5).

natural human imperatives".[36] We would not trace back to the years of famine, drought, and absence of government that enabled Al-Shabab to seize power on the promise of national security. Terrorism would be internal to Somalia, period. Another example comes from neorealism which takes the international system as a spontaneous emergence from the unintended consequences of state interaction.[37] This is problematic because the current international system is predominantly a result of decision making on the part of states and non-state actors (such as international terrorist groups). Historical sociology's solution to this is to "naturalise the present and reveal that it emerged not in accordance with natural human impulses, but rather through processes of power, identity/social exclusion and norms".[38] By studying these processes, a hallmark of critical theory as well as historical sociology, theorizing about the international system becomes more complex but also closer to a true understanding of the world order.

Chronofetishism forces social scientists to function in problem solving theories (e.g. liberalism, realism), preventing the formation of critical theories. For neorealists, system maintenance is paramount and for liberals a society built on liberal capitalism and democracy is the "terminus of history".[39] To counter these ideas, historical sociology attempts to "reveal the present as constituted by transformative processes that continuously reconstitute present institutions and practices".[40] For Hobson, it is not just chronofetishism that upholds an ahistorical perspective in traditional IR theories, it is also "tempocentrism." Tempocentrism is a "methodology in which theorists look at history through a chronofetishist lens".[41] By doing this, all systems become "isomorphic (i.e. having the same structure)".[42] History then becomes a storyline with repetitive highlights; Athens and Sparta are modern day USA and USSR, all great-power wars are rooted in the same causes,

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[36] Ibid. 7.

[37] Waltz, Kenneth Neal. Theory of international politics . New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979. 91.

[38] Hobson, John M. "What's as state in 'bringing historical sociology back into international relations'? Transcending 'chronofetishism' and tempocentrism' in international relations." In *Historical Sociology of International Relations,* edited by Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson, 3-41. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 7.

[39] Fukuyama, Francis. "Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 24, no. 4 (1991). 659-664.

[40] Hobson, John M. "What's as state in 'bringing historical sociology back into international relations'? Transcending 'chronofetishism' and tempocentrism' in international relations." In *Historical Sociology of International Relations,* edited by Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson, 3-41. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 7.

[41] Ibid. 7.

[42] Ibid.

etc.[43] Historical sociology wants to disrupt the tradition of tempocentrism by reinserting history into international relations, proving that there has not been one international system but many, that not all imperialism is uniform, that different social processes create the world order we live in today, etc.[44]

As shown, history serves as a valuable tool when attempting to understand today's international system. There are also, however, concerns with the historical approach from both IR theorists and sociologists. The most basic concern being the very dynamic of the history we study. Postcolonial scholars make the argument that the history we have is western-centric and sorely lacking in perspective. The Cold War, for example, was also an era of hot wars. How does this then inform our study of USSR/USA power dynamics? More importantly, how does this shape our understanding of the post-Cold War world? Historical sociology is also facing "renewed hoary old social scientific debates about methodology and the proper role of theory in historical explanation".[45] Some sociologists are concerned that "the norms of history were coming to replace traditional sociological standards for assessing research".[46] The predominant issue stems from the methodological practices in historical sociology, specifically that general theories are being disregarded in favor of "inductive methods [ ] over deductive ones, and general explanations of social outcomes [ ] denigrated in favor of those stressing complexity, uniqueness, and historical contingency".[47] Here lies the danger of using one area of study to inform another when they have different methodologies.

History can no doubt add to the epistemology of sociology and IR, but can (or should) it inform theory making? Is there a way to infuse history into our study of IR without losing measurable methodologies? Margaret Somers lays the claim that "science does not exist outside its own historical conditions[48]". This is a stark

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[43] Gilpin, Robert. *War and Change in World Politics* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

[44] Hobson, John M. "What's as state in 'bringing historical sociology back into international relations'? Transcending 'chronofetishism' and tempocentrism' in international relations." In *Historical Sociology of International Relations,* edited by Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson, 3-41. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 10-11.

[45] Kiser, Edgar, and Michael Hechter. "The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics." *American Journal of Sociology* 104, no. 3 (1998). 785.

[46] Ibid. 786.

[47] Ibid. 785.

[48] Since IR theory is forever chasing the hard sciences, an excellent illustration of this comes from biology; "The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance Based on Stereotypical Male-Female Roles." The author states, "I am intrigued by the possibility that culture shapes how biological scientists describe what they discover about the natural world" (Martin 1991, 485). Not even the natural world is immune to its context.

contrast to realists "who are willing to assume the existence of underlying causes that generate relations between the observable".[49] In juxtaposing these two approaches, we must asses whether there is more harm in relying on assumptions or in endless reflexivity. If there is indeed harm in utilizing history in explanation, what harm comes from applying economics (or better yet, physics) to human decision making? By adopting the historical sociological approach we are subjecting ourselves to being constantly aware of the context from which our knowledge emerges from, but this is reflective of the very nature of international relations: constantly shifting. Reverting to natural science oriented approaches only makes IR theorists more susceptible to the pitfalls of monocausal explanation.

Conclusions

When determining the value of an approach to theories, it is pertinent to remember that "theories are always for someone and something".[50] Some claim that the sociological approach cannot be applied to international relations[51] while others see this as irrelevant to the worth of sociology to IR.[52] What has become clear in IR theory is a lack of cohesive values. Is the scientific process paramount to all other factors? Are there no merits to studying history? It is simple enough to state the task of an IR theory: "a construction of significant data which yield results for our understanding of, and action in, the world out there"[53] but it becomes much more difficult to develop theories once one is forced to address fickle human nature. Convoluted human choice will always pose endless complications for IR theorists' understanding of world politics.

In order to determine the best approach to understanding world politics, we must decide what (or who) we cannot do without when building a theory. The

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[49] Kiser, Edgar, and Michael Hechter. "The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics." *American Journal of Sociology* 104, no. 3 (1998). 790.

[50] Hirst, Aggie. "Hegemony and Social Forces: Critical Theory in International Relations." Lecture, Theories of International Relations from King's College London, London, December 5th, 2017.

[51] "Despite the wealth of historical sociological contributions, the international itself has continued to elude a genuinely sociological definition. By 'the international', I mean that dimension of social reality which arises specifically from the coexistence within it of more than one society. And by a 'sociological definition', I mean one which directly formulates this dimension as an object of social theory — organically contained, that is, within a conception of social development itself ." (Rosenberg 2006, 308).

[52] See: "Advances and impasses in Fred Halliday's international historical sociology: a critical appraisal" by Benno Teschke, pg. 1092.

[53] Guzzini, Stefano. "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations." European Journal of International Relations Vol 6, Issue 2 (June 2, 2000). 157.

merits of the sociological approach to international relations stem from its focus on human nature and social practice. If we were to remove people and social practice from the IR equation we would be left with peaceful anarchy indeed....and little need for the study of international relations.

The sociological approach lends itself to the world of critical theories with its emphasis on reflexivity and the social. The sociological approach is not without risk. As previously outlined, utilising this approach comes with methodological baggage amongst other concerns. These flaws should not be dismissed, but an innovative interpretation of structure/agency and sovereignty, along with a sound historical base, is essential to understanding world politics, thus making the sociological approach invaluable.

IN-SECURITY

WINTER 2018 / ISSUE 01

STUDENT PAPER SERIES